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Notes 
PROTECTING INFORMED PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION:  ANTI-SLAPP LAW AND THE 
MEDIA DEFENDANT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1996, television talk show host Oprah Winfrey focused an episode 
of her show on the topic of dangerous foods, including a discussion on 
beef and mad cow disease.1  Texas cattlemen alleged that Winfrey’s 
remarks on the show had caused cattle futures to drop and sued her on a 
business disparagement claim.2  Winfrey defended the suit in federal 
court and the Fifth Circuit determined that the cattlemen had failed to 
show that Winfrey or her guests had made false statements on the 
program.3  While a media giant as wealthy as Winfrey may have the 
resources to defend such a suit to its end, the litigation might have been 
effective to silence a defendant with fewer resources at his or her 
disposal. 
In 2003, radio talk show host Tom Leykis refused to air comedian 
Marty Ingels’ comments when Ingels called in to Leykis’s show because 
Ingels was outside the show’s targeted age demographic.4  Unlike Oprah 
Winfrey, Tom Leykis and Westwood One Broadcasting Services had the 
benefit of California Civil Procedure Code, section 425.16.5  Section 
425.16 permits a party to file a special motion to strike a claim arising out 
of “any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition 
or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in 
                                                 
1 Engler v. Winfrey, 201 F.3d 680, 683-84 (5th Cir. 2000). 
2 Id. at 684-85; Tim Jones, The Public Starts SLAPPing Back; States Enact Relief for Sued 
Dissenters, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 26, 2005, at 11. 
3 Engler, 201 F.3d at 687-89.  The case was initiated in Texas state court and then 
removed to federal court upon a motion by the defendants.  Id. at 684-85.  Texas has not 
enacted legislation deterring SLAPPs.  See The California Anti-SLAPP Project, 
http://www.casp.net/ (last visited Sept. 28, 2006) (listing all current anti-SLAPP 
legislation across the United States, including pending bills). 
4 Robert W. Welkos, Not Too Old to Sue Tom Leykis; Comedian Marty Ingels, Who Called the 
Show, Says He’s Fighting Age Bias with a Lawsuit Against the Radio Host, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 
2005, at E1.  Leykis’s radio show was aimed at young singles and Ingels called the show 
because he found Leykis’s dating advice offensive.  Id. 
5 Ingels v. Westwood One Broad. Servs., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 944 (Ct. App. 2005), 
reh’g denied, No. S134735, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 9474 (Cal. Aug. 24, 2005) (concluding that 
Leykis’s and the radio station’s act of providing a forum through a radio talk show was 
within the scope of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006)). 
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connection with a public issue.”6  Ingels filed an age discrimination 
lawsuit against Leykis and the station, but because of section 425.16, both 
Leykis and the station were able to protect their editing discretion and 
get the suit dismissed at an early stage of the litigation.7  Under the 
statute, Ingels was also responsible for the defendants’ attorney’s fees.8   
Since the late 1980s, public concern over lawsuits aimed at punishing 
or silencing a party’s exercise of free speech or right to petition the 
government has been slowly on the rise.9  Such suits are termed Strategic 
Lawsuits Against Public Participation (“SLAPPs”).10  SLAPP suits are 
frequently identified with development projects in which citizens 
petition local government to curtail certain development activity and the 
developers sue the citizens to discourage their complaints.11  
Consequently, most states that have passed anti-SLAPP legislation have 
done so with the large commercial developer versus local citizen 
scenario in mind.12  However, comparatively few states have passed anti-
SLAPP legislation that protects broader First Amendment interests such 
as freedom of speech and freedom of the press.13   
A narrowly-worded statute may protect most direct citizen 
communications with government officials, but do little to prevent 
SLAPP suits aimed at citizens for speech not directly addressed to 
government officials or suits filed with the specific intent of silencing the 
media on a given issue.14  The Society of Professional Journalists (“SPJ”) 
has encouraged states to enact anti-SLAPP legislation protecting a free 
press and has drafted a model anti-SLAPP law and lobbying plan.15  
                                                 
6 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1); see Ingels, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 939. 
7 See Ingels, 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 949; see also Welkos, supra note 4, at E1. 
8 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (stating that “a prevailing defendant on a special 
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s fees and costs”); Ingels, 28 
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 949. 
9 Margaret Graham Tebo, Offended by a SLAPP: As Lawsuits Against Citizens Expand, 
Countermeasures Are Rolled Out, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2005, at 16 (describing the increased 
proliferation of different types of SLAPP suits).  See generally Jones, supra note 2, at 11 
(discussing the increasing amount of state legislation aimed at stopping SLAPP litigation). 
10 See infra Part II.A. 
11 See infra Part II.A; see also Malena F. Barzilai, Public Taking a ‘SLAPP’ with Filing of 
Frivolous Suits; Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, THE QUILL, Sept. 1, 2004, at 22 
(describing an example of a common SLAPP as “a defamation suit brought by a land 
developer against an individual who spoke out against the developer’s plan during a 
zoning board meeting”). 
12 See infra Part II.C.1. 
13 See infra Parts II.C.2-II.C.3. 
14 See infra Part II.C. 
15 See Barzilai, supra note 11, at 22.  This Note argues for a similar definition of protected 
activity to that set forth in the SPJ model statute: “conduct in furtherance of the exercise of 
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Unfortunately, the view that the media is too powerful and intrusive 
may be one reason why many anti-SLAPP laws are not worded to 
include media activity.16   
A free press has long been recognized as one of the bedrocks of 
citizen participation in government through its role in keeping people 
informed about issues of public concern and providing a forum for 
debate about public issues.17  An individual or organization bringing an 
                                                                                                             
the constitutional right of free speech in connection with an issue of public concern, or in 
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition.”  Id.  Scholars George W. 
Pring and Penelope Canan have also proposed a model anti-SLAPP statute that defines 
protected activity as: 
Acts in furtherance of the constitutional right to petition, including 
seeking relief, influencing action, informing, communicating, and 
otherwise participating in the processes of government, shall be 
immune from civil liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except 
where not aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral action, 
result, or outcome. 
GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT 203 
(1996) [hereinafter PRING & CANAN].  The text leading up to Pring and Canan’s proposed 
definition of protected activity does not specifically contemplate media defendants.  See id. 
at 188-201. 
16 See Barzilai, supra note 11, at 22 (advocating anti-SLAPP legislation broad enough to 
protect the media, but acknowledging that overly broad language would be unlikely to 
garner sufficient support in state legislatures or with public interest groups); Enrique J. 
Giminez, Who Watches the Watchdogs?: The Status of Newsgathering Torts Against the Media in 
Light of the Food Lion Reversal, 52 ALA. L. REV. 675 (2001) (criticizing the media as an entity 
that creates news for profit as opposed to reporting news to inform the public); Lyrissa 
Barnett Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should 
Do About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 173-84, 234-39 (1998) (criticizing sensationalized news and 
arguing for a clearer interpretation of the tort of intrusion to protect individual privacy 
against the media); Tebo, supra note 9, at 16 (“Juries hate the media. God help you when 
you sue the almighty media and they make you out like some kind of nut.” (quoting 
Cincinnati attorney Richard Creighton)). 
17 Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (explaining 
that speech on “matters of public concern” is “at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
protection” (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978))); Cox 
Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (“In the first place, in a society in which each 
individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the 
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in 
convenient form the facts of those operations.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
270 (1964) (considering a public official’s defamation suit “against the background of a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open”).  See generally David A. Anderson, The Origins of the 
Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983) (giving a history of the Press Clause and 
recognizing the importance of press to citizen participation in government); Jon Paul Dilts, 
The Press Clause and Press Behavior: Revisiting the Implications of Citizenship, 7 COMM. L. & 
POL’Y 25 (2002) (discussing the tension between First Amendment protections of speech 
and newsgathering conduct in the context of role of the press as citizen); Paul A. LeBel, The 
Constitutional Interest in Getting the News: Toward a First Amendment Protection from Tort 
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action to silence the media is often asserting a claim of defamation, 
invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress—
defamation in particular being one of the most common complaints in 
SLAPP litigation.18  Anti-SLAPP protection for the media could 
streamline the existing protections of the press against defamation and 
invasion of privacy claims by providing a smooth, efficient process for 
defeating suits brought to silence legitimate media reporting.19  In a 
society in which the media plays a crucial role in informing citizens 
about current issues and encouraging them to participate in government, 
anti-SLAPP legislation that protects the press should be a priority for 
every state. 
Part II of this Note categorizes the different definitions of protected 
activity under anti-SLAPP statutes as Narrow, Moderate, or Broad.20  
Part III analyzes why the media has failed or succeeded in defending 
itself through the anti-SLAPP laws of different states and whether the 
laws as administered reflect or expand the First Amendment protections 
articulated in U.S. Supreme Court precedent.21  Based on the case law 
from the states that have examined the applicability of anti-SLAPP law 
to media defendants, Part III also examines the state anti-SLAPP 
definitions of petitioning activity and burdens of proof that best protect 
citizen participation for both individuals and the media without leaving 
the door open for media abuse.22  Drawing on the strongest aspects of 
the existing state statutes, Part IV proposes a model definition of 
petitioning activity and burden of proof for states seeking to enact anti-
                                                                                                             
Liability for Surreptitious Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1145 (1996) (arguing for a 
balancing test in the application of tort law to newsgathering conduct due to the public 
interests implicated in press communications). 
18 Barbara Arco, Comment, When Rights Collide: Reconciling the First Amendment Rights of 
Opposing Parties in Civil Litigation, 52 U. MIAMI L. REV. 587, 612 (1998) (“Defamation is by 
far the most commonly utilized tort [in SLAPP suits].”). 
19 See, e.g., Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. 
Ct. 368 (2005) (invoking the state anti-SLAPP statute to defeat a plaintiff’s invasion of 
privacy claim when the press had published information that was a matter of public 
record); Thompson v. Emmis Television Broad., 894 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 2005) 
(invoking anti-SLAPP protection to deflect a defamation suit brought by a plaintiff who 
was a public figure); see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 189 (describing effective 
early procedural review as an essential element of an effective anti-SLAPP law). 
20 See infra Part II.C.  Within each category, Part II also explores the media’s use of anti-
SLAPP statutes and success or lack thereof based on the nature of protected activity and 
the safeguards written into each statute to prevent abuse. 
21 See infra Part III. 
22 See infra Part III. 
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SLAPP legislation that protects the freedom of the press.23  Part V 
concludes this Note with a summary of the argument for media 
protection under state anti-SLAPP law.24   
The existing case law on the subject demonstrates that the extent of 
anti-SLAPP protection the press can invoke is directly related to the 
language of the statutes that legislatures enact.25  As this discussion will 
illustrate, anti-SLAPP legislation broad enough to protect the press also 
serves the purpose of promoting citizen participation in government by 
protecting the source from which many citizens glean critical 
information about current events.26   
II.  BACKGROUND:  ANTI-SLAPP LAW AND THE MEDIA DEFENDANT 
Beginning in 1989, states began addressing the problem of SLAPP 
litigation aimed at discouraging people from exercising their right to 
petition the government.27  Part II.A sets forth the definition of a SLAPP 
and discusses the most common aspects of such suits.28  Next, Part II.B 
examines the current protections that the media enjoys in regard to 
claims of defamation, libel, and invasion of privacy under Supreme 
Court precedent as compared with state anti-SLAPP standards.29  Part 
II.C categorizes the statutory solutions that state legislatures have used 
to address SLAPPs and examine the media’s use of anti-SLAPP statutes 
within the differing scopes of SLAPP protection.30   
A. Anatomy of a SLAPP 
The acronym SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public 
Participation, a term first coined by George W. Pring and Penelope 
                                                 
23 See infra Part IV.  See also supra note 15 for other proposed definitions of protected 
activity. 
24 See infra Part V. 
25 See infra Parts II.C.1- II.C.3 (comparing and contrasting the protections of all current 
anti-SLAPP legislation as it relates to the media). 
26 See infra Part III; see also supra note 17 (describing the importance of the press in 
democratic government). 
27 Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to Copyright Protection 
Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603, 609 (2005). 
28 See infra Part II.A.  The discussion in Part II.A draws heavily on Pring and Canaan’s 
book, SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out.  Published in 1996, the book was one of the 
earliest thorough examinations of the SLAPP suit trend and provides a detailed description 
of each of the most common kinds of SLAPP suits.  See generally PRING & CANAN, supra note 
15. 
29 See infra Part II.B. 
30 See infra Part II.C. 
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Canan, two prominent scholars in the field of SLAPPs.31  A SLAPP suit is 
a meritless lawsuit initiated to discourage a party from exercising its 
First Amendment right to petition the government or right of free 
speech.32  Pring and Canan describe the typical SLAPP suit as a civil suit 
that targets a non-government party for that party’s communication or 
other efforts directed at influencing government action on a matter of 
public concern.33  A plaintiff bringing a SLAPP suit is not necessarily 
interested in winning the case.34  Rather, SLAPP suits are used to deter or 
to punish a party for exercising its political rights by forcing that party to 
waste time and resources defending its petitioning activity in court.35  
Claims that frequently appear in SLAPP litigation include defamation, 
libel, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, 
conspiracy, and tortious interference with contract or business 
relationships.36  Pring and Canan describe the most common SLAPP 
scenarios as real estate development cases where a development 
company sues homeowners who have petitioned local government 
                                                 
31 PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 3; see Stephen L. Kling, Missouri’s New Anti-SLAPP 
Law, 61 J. MO. B. 124, 124 (2005) (describing Pring and Canan’s book, Getting Sued for 
Speaking Out, supra note 15, as “a bible for lawyers in disputes involving citizen opposition 
and for governmental officials in adopting anti-SLAPP legislation”). 
32 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”); PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 1; see Kling, supra note 31, 
at 124 (“The primary purpose of a SLAPP lawsuit is not to resolve the allegation in the 
petition, but to punish or retaliate against citizens who have spoken out against the 
plaintiffs in the political arena and to intimidate those who would otherwise speak in the 
future.”); see also Arco, supra note 18, at 589 (“The underlying strategy for these [SLAPP] 
suits is retaliation, aimed at intimidating an individual from engaging in particular 
behavior believed to be detrimental to the SLAPP filer.”). 
33 PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 8-11.  Pring & Canan break down the parties 
involved in a SLAPP suit and then recount the step-by-step process of the classic SLAPP 
scenario.  Id. at 10-11.  A party filing a SLAPP files a civil suit against a non-government 
party on an issue of substantial public or social import.  Id. at 8-9.  The typical situation 
involves citizens who take a position on an issue of public concern and express their views 
to a government decision-maker.  Id. at 10.  A party opposing the citizen group decides that 
it is finished battling the citizens in the public, political arena and forces the citizens into 
the private, legal arena with a lawsuit based on their political activity.  Id.  The citizen 
group may win the suit, but may have spent months or years in court doing so.  Id. at 10-11. 
34 See Kling, supra note 31, at 124 (explaining that SLAPP suits are filed for retaliation 
and intimidation, often with the hope of spreading fear through an entire community). 
35 Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992), aff’d, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“The longer the litigation can be stretched out, the more litigation 
that can be churned, the greater the expense that is inflicted and the closer the SLAPP filer 
moves to success.”). 
36 PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 150 (instructing attorneys on the common claims 
that signal a SLAPP suit); Arco, supra note 18, at 590. 
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against a development project, public servants who sue the citizens for 
criticizing their conduct, commercial interests that sue environmental 
organizations for challenging their activities in regard to the manner in 
which those activities impact the environment, and corporate interests 
that sue consumers or workers that have blown the whistle on illegal 
corporate practices.37 
SLAPP suits are a national problem because they have been very 
effective.38  Even if a party that has been the target of a SLAPP suit 
ultimately wins in court, the party may have spent months or years 
defending the suit and accumulated significant legal fees.39  The threat of 
a major lawsuit is often more than enough to silence the petitioning 
activity of people who would otherwise seek to be actively involved in 
government affairs.40   
Many states have responded to the problem of SLAPP suits by 
passing anti-SLAPP legislation.41  Currently, twenty-four states and one 
United States territory have enacted anti-SLAPP laws.42  Ten states have 
                                                 
37 PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 30, 46, 83, 128.  Pring and Canan also discuss “not in 
my backyard” or “NIMBY” suits, which are SLAPP suits regarding locally unwanted land 
uses.  Id. at 105-27.  The authors characterize the NIMBY suit as a combination of the suits 
that occur between land developers and citizens and those that occur between corporate 
interests and environmentalists.  Id. at 106. 
38 Id. at 219 (describing the chilling effect of SLAPP suits); see also Gordon, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 
656 (“Short of a gun to the head, a greater threat to First Amendment expression can 
scarcely be imagined.”). 
39 See Gordon, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 656 (“Those who lack the financial resources and 
emotional stamina to play out the ‘game’ face the difficult choice of defaulting despite 
meritorious defenses or being brought to their knees to settle.”); see also PRING & CANAN, 
supra note 15, at 217-18 (explaining that disproportionate damages are a common feature of 
SLAPP suits and that while many SLAPP targets may ultimately win the suits, the average 
time it took to resolve such suits was forty months). 
40 PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 219. 
41 See id. at 188-207 (discussing the main components of an anti-SLAPP law).  Pring and 
Canan argue that anti-SLAPP legislation must: (1) cover all public advocacy and 
communication with government; (2) cover all government bodies and agents; and (3) set 
out early review in the process of a SLAPP and shift the burden of proof to the filer.  Id. at 
189-90.  The authors examine the then six existing anti-SLAPP statutes in detail and 
propose their own model statute.  Id. at 190-207. 
42 ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 to -508 (2006); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 425.16 to .17 
(West 2004 & Supp. 2006); CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 2004 & Supp. 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 10, §§ 8136-8138 (1999); FLA. STAT. §§ 768.295, 720.304 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 
(2006); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 17101-17109 (2006); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to -4 
(Supp. 2005); IND. CODE § 34-7-7-1 to -10 (2006); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2005); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (2000); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 to 
.05 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241 to -246 (1995); NEV. 
REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 to .670 (2002); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (LexisNexis 2004); 
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proposed anti-SLAPP legislation but have yet to enact an anti-SLAPP bill 
into law, while Pennsylvania and Missouri have both considered bills 
that would strengthen existing anti-SLAPP protections.43  Common 
features of anti-SLAPP laws include a mechanism for early procedural 
review and a mandatory award of attorney’s fees for a party whose 
motion to dismiss under the statute is successful.44 
                                                                                                             
N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney Supp. 2007); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g), 3212(h) 
(McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (West 1993); OR. REV. 
STAT. §§ 31.150-.155 (2005); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7707, §§ 8301-8305 (West Supp. 2006); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-1 to -2 (2006); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-67 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§§ 4-21-1001 to -1004 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2002); WASH. REV. 
CODE §§ 4-24-500 to -520 (West 2005).  See California Anti-SLAPP Project, supra note 3, for a 
list of states with anti-SLAPP statutes and pending bills. 
43 The list of states that have considered anti-SLAPP bills without yet enacting an anti-
SLAPP statute includes Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Michigan, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Texas, and Virginia.  See California Anti-SLAPP Project, supra note 
3, for the text of bills that state legislatures have considered.  Both Missouri and 
Pennsylvania have considered legislation contemplating stronger anti-SLAPP measures 
than the State’s current anti-SLAPP statute.  Id.  For example, Missouri’s current anti-
SLAPP statute defines petitioning activity as “conduct or speech undertaken or made in 
connection with a public hearing or public meeting, in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a 
tribunal or decision-making body of the state or any political subdivision of the state” and 
does not include a particular burden of proof for a party filing a SLAPP.  MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 537.528(1).  In 2005, 2006, and 2007, Missouri considered bills that would have changed 
the definition of protected activity.  The most recent bill defines protected activity as 
speech or other petitioning activities undertaken or made at or in 
connection with a public hearing or public meeting, in a quasi-judicial 
proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of the state or 
any political subdivision of the state [is] shall be immune from civil 
liability, regardless of intent or purpose and shall possess a qualified 
privilege against liability for slander or libel, where such conduct, 
speech, or other petitioning activity is aimed at procuring any 
governmental action, result, or outcome. 
H.B. 163, 94th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2007).  The bill would have added the 
further requirement that the party filing suit prove through a preponderance of the 
evidence that the conduct of the party attempting to invoke anti-SLAPP protection was not 
immune from liability.  Id. 
44 States whose laws include a mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a SLAPP target 
who prevails on a motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP law include California, Florida, 
Guam, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and Washington.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE 
§ 425.16(c); FLA. STAT. § 768.295(5); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 17106(g); HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 634F-2(8)(b); IND. CODE § 34-7-7-7; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(B); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 231, § 59H; MINN. STAT. § 554.04(1); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528(2); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§  41.670; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(B); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.152(3); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-
2(2)(d); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-1003(c); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510.  States whose laws 
provide that a SLAPP target prevailing on a motion to dismiss may recover attorney’s fees 
and costs include Arkansas, Delaware, Georgia, Maine, and New York.  ARK. CODE ANN. 
§ 16-63-506(b)(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8138(a)(1); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b); ME. 
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The main challenge state legislatures face in drafting an anti-SLAPP 
statute is that in protecting one party’s right to petition, an anti-SLAPP 
law can directly infringe on the petitioning rights of the opposing 
party.45  For this reason, legislatures have sought to draft—and courts 
have sought to interpret—anti-SLAPP statutes in ways that protect the 
rights of all parties involved.46  Some states have decided to draft broad 
anti-SLAPP laws and have left it to the courts to limit their reach through 
narrow interpretations of the statutes, while others have chosen to word 
their anti-SLAPP provisions narrowly to apply only to select situations.47  
                                                                                                             
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a(1)(a).  Nebraska and Utah permit 
a party who has been the target of a SLAPP to maintain an action for attorney’s fees and 
costs.  NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,243(1); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-105.  See supra note 41 for 
Pring and Canan’s breakdown of the common features of anti-SLAPP laws. 
45 See Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998) 
(criticizing the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute for favoring one party’s right to petition 
over another’s). 
46 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b) (requiring written verification that the 
complaint against a party for any acts of petition or free speech is well grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law or a good faith argument to modify existing law); see also R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(a) (limiting immunity to communications genuinely aimed at 
procuring favorable government action, result or outcome and excluding objectively or 
subjectively baseless free speech or petitioning activity); Atlanta Humane Soc’y. v. Harkins, 
603 S.E.2d 289, 291-92 (Ga. 2004) (construing the anti-SLAPP statute such that a court must 
also determine that the complaint was falsely verified by failing to be well-grounded in fact 
or law, brought for improper purpose, or brought against otherwise privileged statements); 
Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 943 (Mass. 1998) (constructing the 
phrase “based on [said party’s right to petition]” to mean that the party moving to dismiss 
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute must make a threshold showing that the opposing 
party’s claims have no substantial basis other than or in addition to the complained of 
petitioning activity); Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 792 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that a party could prevail over a motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute if the party could prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the moving party’s communication amounted to a tort). 
47 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.295(4) (“No governmental entity in this state shall file or 
cause to be filed . . . any lawsuit . . . against a person or entity without merit and solely 
because such person or entity has exercised the right to peacefully assemble, the right to 
instruct representatives, and the right to petition for redress of grievances before the 
various governmental entities of this state . . . .”).  Compare id. § 768.295(4), with CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (Deering 2006), which defines protected activity to include 
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding 
authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding 
authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in 
a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 
issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (emphasis added). 
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Most states have attempted to balance the petitioning rights of the 
parties through a procedural safeguard such as a strict burden of proof 
standard and requiring each side of the controversy to provide some 
evidence of the merit of its position before a court rules on dismissing 
the claim.48   
                                                 
48 See supra note 46.  Arkansas and Georgia both require a party filing a suit against a 
person or entity arising from actions by the person or entity that could reasonably be 
construed as acts in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition the 
government to submit a verification that the complaint is well grounded in fact or existing 
law or a good faith argument to change existing law.  ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-505; GA. 
CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b). 
 California and Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP laws provide that a cause of action against a 
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or 
free speech in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike 
unless the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that 
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1); LA. CODE CIV. 
PROC. ANN. art. 971(A)(1). 
 Delaware and New York require that the plaintiff prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendant’s communication was false or made with reckless disregard as 
to whether it was false where truth or falsity is material to the action.  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
10, § 8136(b); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW§ 76-a.  Different sections of the Delaware and New 
York anti-SLAPP statutes require a party responding to an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss to 
prove that the complaint is well grounded in fact or existing law or a good faith argument 
to change existing law.  DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 10, § 8137; N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 70-a; N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3211(g), 3212(h) (McKinney 2005 & Supp. 2007).  Nebraska’s burden of proof is 
similar to Deleware’s and New York’s in that the party responding to an anti-SLAPP 
motion to dismiss must demonstrate that the cause of action has a substantial basis in law 
or is supported by a substantial argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,245. 
 Guam requires the party who has filed a suit that could be characterized as a SLAPP 
to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the targeted party’s actions were not 
immune pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.  GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 17106(e) (2006). 
 By contrast, Hawaii requires only that the party opposing an anti-SLAPP motion to 
dismiss show by a preponderance of the evidence that its suit is not a SLAPP suit.  HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 634F-2(6). 
 Florida, Indiana, Missouri, Nevada, and New Mexico all require the court to treat an 
anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss 
on the pleadings.  FLA. STAT. § 768.295(5), 720.304(4); IND. CODE § 34-7-7-9; MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 537.528(2); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660(3)(a); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(B). 
 Maine and Massachusetts both require a party responding to an anti-SLAPP motion to 
dismiss to prove that the moving party’s exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any 
reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law and that the moving party’s acts 
caused actual injury to the responding party.  ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556; MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 231, § 59H.  Massachusetts requires the moving party to prove that the 
responding party’s suit is based solely on the moving party’s exercise of its right to petition 
the government before the aforementioned burden switches to the responding party.  
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H. 
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While the government interest in protecting citizens’ rights to 
petition is compelling, the anti-SLAPP statutes with broad protections 
for the exercise of free speech have been susceptible to use in situations 
other than the typical SLAPP scenario.49  A possible explanation is that 
SLAPP suits actually take many forms that are not deterred by narrowly 
focused anti-SLAPP statutes.50  One use of anti-SLAPP law that a state 
legislature may not ordinarily contemplate involves the media as the 
defendant in a defamation, libel, or invasion of privacy suit.51   
B. Supreme Court Protection of the Press Against Libel, Defamation, and 
Invasion of Privacy Claims 
The First Amendment specifically enumerates the freedom of the 
press as one of the basic rights protected under its provisions.52  
However, the First Amendment does not grant the press unlimited 
license to publish defamatory or libelous statements, disclose 
                                                                                                             
 Minnesota requires the party responding to an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss to prove 
by clear and convincing evidence that the moving party’s actions constituted a tort or a 
violation of a person’s constitutional rights.  MINN. STAT. § 554.02(2)(3). 
 Oregon, like Massachusetts, imposes some burden of proof on each side pursuant to 
an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.  However, the standard that the plaintiff must meet in 
the action is closer to the standard in California or Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statutes.  In 
Oregon, the defendant making a special motion to strike must first make a prima facie 
showing that the plaintiff’s claim arises out of conduct covered by the statute. OR. REV. 
STAT. § 31.150(3) (2005).  If the defendant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the 
plaintiff to establish that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim by 
presenting substantial evidence to support a prima facie case.  Id. 
49 See, e.g., Fabre v. Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780 (Mass. 2002).  In Fabre, a woman successfully 
used the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute to defeat her former boyfriend’s claim of abuse 
of process for obtaining a restraining order against him.  Id. at 783, 787; see also McBrayer, 
supra note 27 (discussing DirectTV’s use of California’s anti-SLAPP statute to defend its 
actions in sending cease and desist letters to people who had purchased illegal cable 
pirating equipment).  In comparison, Hawks v. Hinely, 556 S.E.2d 547 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) 
provides an example of a more typical SLAPP situation.  When city officials sued citizens 
for the citizens’ formal applications to recall the officials from office, the court held that the 
anti-SLAPP clearly applied to the case given that the law was enacted to prevent abusive 
litigation against a person exercising the right to participate in government.  Id. at 550.  In 
Morse Bros., Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842, 852 (Me. 2001), when a mulch company brought 
suit against abutting property owners for the owners’ acts of petition against the mulch 
company’s development plans, the court ruled that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the 
case and dismissed the mulch company’s suit. 
50 See supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Tebo, supra note 9, at 16 (describing 
the proliferation of different kinds of SLAPP suits). 
51 See infra Parts II.C.2-II.C.3. 
52 U.S. CONST. amend. I, supra note 32; see also 16A AM. JUR. 2d Constitutional Law § 450 
(2004) (explaining that the “rights of freedom of speech and of the press are among the 
fundamental rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by state action . . . .”). 
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information that is not of public concern, or exemption from generally 
applicable laws when it comes to the process of newsgathering.53  While 
the limits on the media are few, the protections afforded the media 
decrease slightly in proportion to the private status of the plaintiff and of 
the information disclosed.54   
One of the most important cases defining media liability for 
defamation claims is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a public official or person running for office 
who brings a defamation claim against the press must prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that the statement in question was false and 
published with actual malice.55  The Court later applied the same 
                                                 
53 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (holding that the media is not 
exempt from generally applicable laws with incidental effects on the press); Dun & 
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985) (holding that a party need 
not prove actual malice to obtain presumed and punitive damages when defamatory 
speech does not involve a matter of public concern); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 346-49 (1974) (holding that states may define media liability in regard to media 
defamation of private individuals, but that a private individual asserting defamation 
arising from remarks on a topic of public concern must demonstrate that the statements 
were made with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to 
whether the statement was false in order to recover damages for defamation); Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1973) (denying the press special access to prisons); Branzberg 
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972) (denying the press special treatment in regard to 
disclosure of sources pursuant to a subpoena); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 
279-80 (1964) (holding that a public official asserting media defamation in regard to his or 
her official conduct must prove that the statements were made with actual malice—
knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether the 
statement was false).  See generally Giminez, supra note 16 (discussing newsgathering torts 
as applied to the media); Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for 
Newsgathering Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B.U. L. REV. 
507, 515-17 (1998) (explaining that the majority rule among courts does not exempt the 
media from tort law in regard to its newsgathering activities). 
54 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 763 (permitting presumed and punitive damages—even 
absent a showing of actual malice—when the media publishes matters not of public 
concern); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346-47 (permitting states to set their own standards of liability of 
the press when the plaintiff is not a public figure).  But see Fl. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 
534-36, 541 (1989) (refusing to hold the press civilly liable for publishing the name of a rape 
victim it had gleaned from public records that the government had accidentally 
disseminated); Cox Broad. Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (refusing to hold 
newspapers liable for publishing the name of a deceased rape victim found in public 
records of the crime). 
55 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).  The Court defined “actual malice” as a statement made 
“with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”  
Id. at 280.  In the analysis preceding its holding, the Court explained that “erroneous 
statement is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of 
expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”  Id. at 271-72 
(quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
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standard of proof to defamation plaintiffs who were not public officials, 
but still qualified as public figures.56   
In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., the Court distinguished between 
private and public figures and held that the states could set their own 
standards of liability regarding media entities that published defamatory 
statements about private individuals.57  The Court limited the standards 
that a state could set by holding that when a defamation plaintiff is a 
private individual and the matter in question is one of public concern, a 
state cannot impose presumed or punitive damages without a showing 
of actual malice.58  By contrast, the Court has not required a plaintiff to 
demonstrate that a statement was made with actual malice to obtain 
presumed and punitive damages when the matter is not of public 
concern.59 
The Supreme Court has also vigorously protected the media 
regarding the publication of truthful material relating to a matter of 
public concern.60  For example, in Bartnicki v. Vopper, when an 
anonymous source provided the media with a recording of the 
intercepted cell phone conversation of two union officials, the Court held 
that because (1) the media had not participated in the illegal interception; 
and (2) the recorded conversation had involved a matter of public 
                                                 
56 Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 
(1967) (decided in the same opinion as Walker); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 
U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (holding that the Sullivan standard applies to public figures seeking 
damages against the press for intentional infliction of emotional distress). 
57 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.  The Court explained that public figures invite “attention and 
comment” whereas a private figure “has relinquished no part of his interest in the 
protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the 
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood.”  Id. at 345. 
58 Id. at 349 (explaining that the state’s interest in protecting the reputation of a private 
individual goes no further than compensation for actual injury). 
59 Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763 (1985).  In arriving at 
its decision, the Court cited Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983), explaining that 
whether a matter is of public concern is determined by its “content, form, and context . . . as 
revealed by the whole record.”  Id. at 761. 
60 Fl. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534-36, 541 (1989) (refusing to hold the press civilly liable 
for publishing the name of a rape victim it had gleaned from public records); Smith v. Daily 
Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979) (stating that “state action to punish the publication 
of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards”); N.Y. Times Co. v. 
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding the right of the press to publish material of 
public concern even though publication compromised the national interest). 
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concern, the media could not be held liable to the plaintiffs for invasion 
of privacy.61   
As these cases illustrate, the Supreme Court has developed some 
common law protections for the press, and as shown in Part II.C, state 
courts have interpreted anti-SLAPP law in ways that generally adhere to 
this precedent.  However, the language of an anti-SLAPP statute is the 
determinative factor in whether or not the press can invoke anti-SLAPP 
protections in the first place. 
C. Identifying Protected Activity Under Anti-SLAPP Law—Three Categories  
While some states have adopted similar anti-SLAPP statutes, no 
single definition of activity shielded from prosecution under anti-SLAPP 
statutes exists.62  The range of activity protected under anti-SLAPP 
statutes falls into three general categories:  (1) statutes worded narrowly 
so as to allow anti-SLAPP protection only in certain statutorily defined 
circumstances, hereinafter referred to as Narrow Statutes; (2) statutes 
that apply only to participation in the processes of government or to 
communication specifically intended to procure government action, 
hereinafter referred to as Moderate Statutes; and (3) statutes that extend 
the definition of protected activity to cover the exercise of a party’s right 
to petition or free speech on any matter of public concern, hereinafter 
referred to as Broad Statutes.63   
1. Narrow Statutes 
Of the three categories, twelve states have passed anti-SLAPP 
statutes that fall into the category of Narrow Statutes, limiting the use of 
anti-SLAPP law to specific sets of circumstances.64  Within this group, 
                                                 
61 532 U.S. 514, 533-35 (2001).  The Court qualified its holding by acknowledging that 
lack of privacy could chill private speech and mentioned in dicta that “some intrusions on 
privacy are more offensive than others, and that the disclosure of the contents of a private 
conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception itself.”  Id. at 
533. 
62 See infra Parts II.C.1-II.C.3. 
63 See infra Parts II.C.1-II.C.3. 
64 DEL. CODE  ANN. tit. 10 §§ 8136-8138 (1999); FLA. STAT. § 768.295, 702.304(4) (2005); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F-1 (Supp. 2005); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2006); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§§ 25-21,241-246 (1995); N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 38-2-9.1 to -9.2 (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney Supp. 2007); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g), 3212(h) (McKinney 
2005 & Supp. 2007); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443.1A (West 1993); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 7707, §§ 8301-8305 (West Supp. 2006); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1004 (2005); 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-58-101 to -105 (2002); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 4-24-500 to -520 (West 
2005). 
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one of the methods that state legislatures have used to narrow the focus 
of anti-SLAPP laws has been to limit the definition of SLAPP suits to 
situations where the plaintiff is a “public applicant or permittee.”65  By 
limiting the class of plaintiffs that could conceivably instigate a SLAPP 
suit, some states limit the use of their anti-SLAPP statutes to 
circumstances involving permits, leasing, licensing, zoning, and other 
entitlements.66   
Other states have defined protected activity as oral or written 
testimony provided to a government entity during the course of a 
government proceeding or in connection with such proceeding, public 
hearing, or public meeting.67  Two states in this category, Tennessee and 
Washington, have limited anti-SLAPP protection to communications 
made to government agencies regarding matters of concern to such 
agencies.68  Florida’s two anti-SLAPP statutes are even narrower than 
Tennessee’s and Washington’s in that Florida Code section 720.304(4) 
limits the use of the anti-SLAPP statute’s protections to “parcel owners” 
and Florida Code section 768.295 applies only to SLAPP suits instigated 
by government entities.69   
                                                 
65 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 8136(a)(1)-(2) (defining an “action involving public petition 
and participation” as “an action, claim, cross-claim or counterclaim for damages that is 
brought by a public applicant or permittee, and is materially related to any efforts of the 
defendant to report on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission,” and 
defining “[p]ublic applicant or permittee” as “any person who has applied for or obtained 
a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission 
to act from any government body, or any person with an interest . . . materially related to 
such application or permission”).  See also NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 242(1) and N.Y. CIV. 
RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a(1), 76-a(a)(1)(a)-(b), for definitions similar to Delaware’s. 
66 See supra note 65; infra note 78. 
67 HAW. REV. STAT. § 634F-1 (defining “public participation” as “any oral or written 
testimony submitted or provided to a governmental body during the course of a 
governmental proceeding”) (emphasis added); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528(1) (limiting the 
statute’s protective reach to “conduct or speech undertaken or made in connection with a 
public hearing or public meeting, in a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or 
decision-making body of the state or any political subdivision of the state”).  For a complete 
explanation of the Missouri anti-SLAPP statute, see generally Kling, supra note 31.  See also 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A), for a definition of protected activity similar to Missouri’s. 
68 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1003(a); WASH. REV. CODE § 4-24-510 (also including self-
regulatory organizations involved in the futures or securities business empowered and 
overseen by a government agency). 
69 FLA. STAT. § 720.304(4)(b) (2005) states that a party: 
may not file or cause to be filed . . . any lawsuit . . . against a parcel 
owner without merit and solely because such parcel owner has 
exercised the right to instruct his or her representatives or the right to 
petition for redress of grievances before the various governmental 
entities of this state . . . . 
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In contrast, Utah’s statute couches its protections in broader 
language by defining protected activity simply as “participating in the 
processes of government.” 70  If Utah courts chose to interpret its anti-
SLAPP law broadly, Utah’s statute could be categorized with the 
Moderate Statutes.71  However, Utah currently requires an element of 
intentional harassment before a suit can be characterized as a SLAPP, 
which likely makes the Utah statute applicable on narrower grounds.72  
Similarly, Pennsylvania’s definition of protected activity is nearly 
identical to that of several of the Moderate Statutes.73  Pennsylvania’s 
anti-SLAPP statute falls into the category of Narrow Statutes because by 
its title, it applies only to environmental law or regulation.74   
                                                                                                             
Similarly, FLA. STAT. § 768.295(4) states that: 
No governmental entity in this state shall file or cause to be 
filed . . . any lawsuit . . . against a person or entity without merit and 
solely because such person or entity has exercised the right to 
peacefully assemble, the right to instruct representatives, and the right 
to petition for redress of grievances before the various governmental 
entities of this state . . . . 
70 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-102(5) (2002) (defining “process of government” as “the 
mechanisms and procedures by which the legislative and executive branches of 
government make decisions, and the activities leading up to the decisions, including the 
exercise by a citizen of the right to influence those decisions under the First Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution”). 
71 See infra Part II.C.2. 
72 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-58-103(1) (defining a SLAPP suit as one that “is primarily based 
on, relates to, or is in response to an act of the defendant while participating in the process 
of government and is done primarily to harass the defendant . . . .”); Anderson Dev. Co. v. 
Tobias, 116 P.3d 323, 339 n.4 (Utah 2005) (explaining that “the cause of action created by the 
SLAPP Act is narrowly defined and is limited to those lawsuits filed primarily to harass the 
defendant and interfere with public participation in the governmental process”).  But see 
Elizabeth Neff, American Fork Man Ordered to Cough Up Publisher’s Legal Fees, Judge Says, The 
Piece Was Protected Political Speech, SALT LAKE TRIB., Sept. 24, 2005, at B3.  The Salt Lake 
Tribune reported an unpublished case in which a newspaper owner successfully invoked 
the protection of Utah’s anti-SLAPP law in regard to a political piece he had published in 
his own newspaper.  Id.  The defendant had spent more than $170,000 defending the case 
and had been forced to sell the newspaper to raise funds for his court battle.  Id. 
73 27 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8301 (West Supp. 2006) (including in its definition of protected 
activity “[a] written or oral statement or writing made . . . in connection with an issue 
under consideration or review by a legislative, executive or judicial body or any other 
official proceeding authorized by law”).  Compare GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(c) (2006); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 556 (2003), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (2000), for 
similar definitions of protected activity as statements made in connection with an issue 
under consideration or review by a government body or reasonably likely to procure 
government review. 
74 27 PA. CONST. STAT. § 8301 (titled “Participation in Environmental Law or 
Regulation”). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/9
2007] Anti-Slapp Law 1251 
Among the Narrow Statutes, Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP law is unique 
in that it appears to have been drafted specifically to aid the press by 
providing protection for reports on government proceedings and 
expressions of opinion or criticism.75  Unfortunately, the overall 
effectiveness of the statute in protecting the petitioning rights of citizens 
is narrow because the law only applies to claims of libel.76  While the 
communications protected by the statute are similar to those protected 
under the Moderate Statutes, as it is written, Oklahoma’s law leaves a 
party’s acts of petition wide open to the many other claims commonly 
used in SLAPP litigation such as tortious interference with contract or 
business relationships, invasion of privacy, or abuse of process.77 
At the date of this writing, with the exception of Oklahoma and New 
York, states that have anti-SLAPP statutes that fall into the Narrow 
Statute category have no published opinions concerning the media as a 
defendant and no published opinions indicating attempted use of their 
anti-SLAPP statutes outside either the typical SLAPP scenario or the 
specific situation contemplated by the statute involved.78  Conversely, 
                                                 
75 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1(B) (1993) (“No publication which under this section would 
be privileged shall be punishable as libel”); see also Price v. Walters, 918 P.2d 1370, 1377 
(Okla. 1996) (“It arouses concern that a freshening stream of libel actions, which often seem 
as much designed to punish writers and publications as to recover damages for real 
injuries, may threaten the public and constitutional interest in free, and frequently rough, 
discussion.” (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., 
concurring))). 
76 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1(B); PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 190-91 (criticizing 
the language of the Oklahoma statute for its failure to provide for claims other than libel, 
for applying only to formal proceedings, and for its failure to provide for a system of 
judicial review). 
77 OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1(A).  The Oklahoma statute defines privileged 
communication to include statements made 
[b]y a fair and true report of any legislative or judicial or other 
proceeding authorized by law, or anything said in the course thereof, 
and any and all expressions of opinion in regard thereto, and criticisms 
thereon, and any and all criticisms upon the official acts of any and all 
public officers, except where the matter stated of and concerning the 
official act done, or of the officer, falsely imputes crime to the officer so 
criticized 
Id.  See infra Part II.B.2 for a comparison of Oklahoma’s statute to statutes with broader 
language. 
78 See the discussion of Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP law, supra Part II.C.1 and notes 75-77.  
Because Oklahoma’s statute is so narrow that it falls outside the argument of this Note, the 
numerous published anti-SLAPP cases involving the press as a defendant in Oklahoma are 
not listed or discussed. 
 New York has one published case, Duane Reade, Inc. v. Clark, 784 N.Y.S.2d 920 (Sup. 
Ct. 2004), involving anti-SLAPP law and the press, but the facts of the case fall strictly 
within the limited applicability of New York’s statute to public applicants or permittees.  In 
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Duane Reade, a drug store chain sued an artist and a newspaper for articles the paper had 
run and advertisements that the artist had taken out that criticized the drug store chain’s 
plans for development.  Id. at 920.  Because the drug store, as an entity contemplating 
development, fit the statutory definition of a pubic applicant or permittee, New York’s 
anti-SLAPP law applied and the court dismissed the drug store’s suit.  Id.  Other recent 
examples of applications of the New York anti-SLAPP statute to non-media defendants 
include T.S. Haulers, Inc. v. Kaplan, 295 A.D.2d 595 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (zoning dispute); 
City of Saratoga Springs v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 279 A.D.2d 756 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) 
(zoning dispute); Miness v. Alter, 262 A.D.2d 374 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (declining to award 
defendants relief under anti-SLAPP statute for newsletter published in opposition to 
mayoral inaction regarding a local development campaign); and Bell v. Little, 250 A.D.2d 
485 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (declining to apply New York anti-SLAPP law to protect 
defendant’s scrawls on doorways and sidewalks because the defendant’s rights to petition 
public agencies remained unaffected). 
 To date, Delaware, Hawaii, Nebraska, and New Mexico have not published any 
opinions citing their anti-SLAPP statutes.  The federal district court examined Hawaii’s 
anti-SLAPP law in Villeza v. United States, CIV. NO. 05-00043 JMS/BMK, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25625 (D. Ha. Jan. 5, 2006) (holding that the government could not invoke Hawaii’s 
anti-SLAPP law when the government had failed to make a prima facie showing that 
Villeza had brought a SLAPP suit). 
 Florida cases include: Florida Fern Growers Ass’n v. Concerned Citizens of Putnam 
County, 616 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1993) (ruling on applicability of anti-SLAPP provision to citizen 
petitions in regard to Ferngrowers Association’s water use); and Londono v. Turkey Creek, 
609 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 1992) (homeowners’ dispute with development company). 
 Missouri cases include Diehl v. Kintz, 162 S.W.3d 152 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (individual 
distributed a handbill in opposition to the construction of a trash transfer station), and 
Mandel v. O’Connor, 99 S.W.3d 33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (public official sued citizens for a 
letter in which they criticized her unwillingness to investigate possible city charter 
violations). 
 Pennsylvania has one case citing its anti-SLAPP statute, Lucchino v. Commonwealth, 809 
A.2d 264 (Pa. 2002), an environmental law dispute. 
 Tennessee does not have any published cases that explore its anti-SLAPP law in 
depth.  Utah cites its anti-SLAPP law in only one case, Anderson Development Co., L.L.C. v. 
Tobias, 116 P.3d 323 (Utah 2005), a real estate development case. 
 Recent Washington cases citing its anti-SLAPP law include Right-Price Recreation, LLC 
v. Connells Prairie Community Council, 46 P.3d 789 (Wash. 2002) (subdivision development 
dispute); Hoechlin v. Urbiha, No. 31247-6-H, 2005 Wash. App. LEXIS 850 (Ct. App. 2005), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 127 Wash. App. 1010 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 
anti-SLAPP law applies to expert witnesses who act in good faith); Emmerson v. Weilep, 110 
P.3d 214 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 126 Wash. App. 1010 (Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the 
anti-SLAPP law requirement that reports to government agencies be made in good faith for 
the statute to apply); Trummel v. Mitchell, No. 48662-4-I, 2004 Wash. App. LEXIS 1208 (Ct. 
App. 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 131 P.3d 306 (Wash. 2006) (holding that anti-SLAPP 
law did not apply to bad faith conduct amounting to harassment); and Gontmakher v. City of 
Bellevue, 85 P.3d 926 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (holding anti-SLAPP applied to city employee’s 
report of property owners’ illegal clear-cutting to the Department of Natural Resources). 
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slightly less than half of the eleven states and one United States territory 
falling into the Broad or Moderate Statute categories have adjudicated 
cases with the media as a SLAPP defendant.79   
2. Moderate Statutes 
Unlike the states with Narrow Statutes, the seven jurisdictions with 
Moderate Statutes do not limit activity protected under anti-SLAPP law 
to particular classes of individuals or types of proceedings.80  Rather, the 
statutes in these states expand the definition of protected activity to 
include not only oral or written statements made to government bodies 
or as part of government proceedings, but also communications made in 
connection with any issue under consideration or review by a government 
body.81  Also included in the Moderate Statute category are states that 
protect communication intended in whole or in part to procure a 
governmental action or result.82  Among the seven Moderate Statute 
                                                 
79 Moderate Statute states with anti-SLAPP cases involving the media include Georgia, 
Massachusetts, and Minnesota.  Broad Statute states that have addressed the media’s use of 
anti-SLAPP law include California, Indiana, Louisiana, and Rhode Island.  See infra Parts 
II.C.2-II.C.3. 
80 GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(c) (2006); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 17104 (2006); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 556 (2003); MINN. STAT. 
§ 554.01 (West 2000); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.637 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-24-67 (1997). 
81 NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.637 defines “[g]ood faith communication in furtherance of the 
right to petition” as: 
1. Communication that is aimed at procuring any governmental or 
electoral action, result or outcome; 
2. Communication of information or a complaint to 
a . . . [government employee] . . . regarding a matter reasonably of 
concern to the respective governmental entity; or 
3. Written or oral statement made in direct connection with an issue 
under consideration by a legislative, executive or judicial body, or any 
other official proceeding authorized by law, which is truthful or is 
made without knowledge of its falsehood. 
See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
14 § 556, for similar definitions of protected statements made in connection with an issue 
under consideration or review by a government body. 
82 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 556 (2003); and MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 
2000) for expanded definitions of petitioning activity that also include “any statement 
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect such [government] 
consideration, or any other statement falling within constitutional protection of the right to 
petition government.”  See also GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 7 § 17104 (2006) (“Acts in furtherance 
of the Constitutional rights to petition, including seeking relief, influencing action, 
informing, communicating and otherwise participating in the processes of government, 
shall be immune from liability, regardless of intent or purpose, except where not aimed at 
procuring any government or electoral action, result or outcome.”); MINN. STAT. § 554.01 
(West 2000) (defining ‘public participation’ as “speech or lawful conduct that is genuinely 
aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action”).   
Hartzler: Protecting Informed Public Participation:  Anti-Slapp Law and the
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007
1254 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
states, Georgia, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island have 
encountered cases where the media has attempted to use anti-SLAPP 
law to dismiss a suit.83  This Note discusses each state in turn. 
                                                 
83 Georgia is included in the Moderate Statute category even though the initial 
protective language of its statute (applicable to “any claim asserted against a person or 
entity arising from an act by that person which could reasonably be construed as an act in 
furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition the government for redress of 
grievances”) is similar to the Broad statutes.  GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b) (emphasis 
added).  The Georgia Code goes on to define an “act in furtherance of the right of free speech or 
the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances” as: 
any written or oral statement, writing, petition made before or to a 
legislative, executive or judicial proceeding, or any other official 
proceeding authorized by law, or any written or oral statement, 
writing, or petition made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any 
other official proceeding authorized by law. 
Id. § 9-11-11.1(c) (emphasis added).  The definition limiting activity protected under the 
Georgia statute to activity connected with government review places Georgia’s anti-SLAPP 
law into the Moderate Statute category.  The Supreme Court of Georgia has also held that 
Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute applies only to speech made in the course of or leading to an 
official proceeding.  Berryhill v. Ga. Cmty. Support & Solutions, No. S06G0038, 2006 Ga. 
LEXIS 988 (Ga. Nov. 28, 2006).  Like Georgia, the language of Rhode Island’s anti-SLAPP 
statute is broad.  R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(a) (defining protected activity as “[a] party’s 
exercise of his or her right of petition or of free speech under the United States or Rhode 
Island constitutions in connection with a matter of public concern”); id. § 9-33-2(e) 
(extending SLAPP immunity to “any oral or written statement . . . made in connection with 
an issue of public concern”).  However, the reach of Rhode Island’s anti-SLAPP statute is 
narrowed by the second and third sentences of R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-33-2(a), which go on to 
explain that SLAPP 
immunity will apply as a bar to any civil claim, counterclaim, or cross-
claim directed at petition or free speech as defined in subsection (e) of 
this section, except if the petition or free speech constitutes a sham. The 
petition or free speech constitutes a sham only if it is not genuinely 
aimed at procuring favorable government action, result, or outcome, 
regardless of ultimate motive or purpose. 
Id. (emphasis added).  Unlike other statutes, Rhode Island’s does not set forth any 
requirements of verification or special burdens of proof that each party must meet.  Rather, 
the statute suggests that in order to defeat an assertion of conditional immunity under the 
statute, a party would need to prove that the party asserting immunity was involved in 
sham petitioning.  Id. § 9-33-2(a).  The statute defines sham petitioning as: 
(1) Objectively baseless in the sense that no reasonable person 
exercising the right of speech or petition could realistically expect 
success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome, and 
(2) Subjectively baseless in the sense that it is actually an attempt to use 
the governmental process itself for its own direct effects.  Use of 
outcome or result of the governmental process shall not constitute use 
of the governmental process itself for its own direct effects. 
Id. §§ 9-33-2(a) (1)-(2).  The Rhode Island Supreme Court examined the liability of an 
individual for speaking out in the media in Alves v. Hometown Newspapers, Inc., 857 A.2d 
743 (R.I. 2004).  Alves sued Alan and William Palazzo for defamation because the two had 
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a. Georgia 
Georgia has addressed the application of anti-SLAPP law to the 
media in only one case.  In 2000, the Georgia Court of Appeals decided 
Davis v. Emmis Publishing Corp., in which Davis sued Atlanta Magazine for 
a story alleging that he called in favors from local officials to stall a 
criminal investigation to prevent his son’s prosecution for murder.84  
Among its defenses, Atlanta Magazine asserted that the Georgia anti-
SLAPP statute protected its communication and asserted that Davis had 
not verified his complaint as required by the statute.85  Davis responded 
two months later by amending and verifying his complaint.86   
Rather than addressing the substantive issue, the court decided the 
case on procedural grounds.87  The appellate court declined to address 
the issue of whether the anti-SLAPP law applied to Atlanta Magazine’s 
claims and dismissed Davis’s appeal because the verification of his 
complaint failed to conform with the procedure set forth in the anti-
SLAPP statute.88  However, in an opinion concurring in the judgment, 
                                                                                                             
written letters to a newspaper critical of Alves’s actions in an official capacity and the 
newspaper published them.  Id. at 747.  The action against the newspaper had already been 
dismissed and William Palazzo was not a party to the appeal.  Id. at 747 n.1.  The court 
affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Palazzo’s letters to the editor were protected under the 
statute because Alves was a public official and failed to prove that Palazzo’s letters were 
objectively baseless.  Id. at 756.  Because the opinion does not discuss the claim against the 
newspaper as a media entity, this Note does not analyze the Rhode Island case.  Neither 
Guam nor Nevada has published any decisions citing to their anti-SLAPP laws.  Maine 
decisions include Maitta Construction, Inc. v. Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169 (Me. 2004) (land 
development dispute); and Morse Brothers, Inc. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842 (Me. 2001) 
(neighbors’ protests of permits for a mulch company due to compliance with noise 
standards). 
84 536 S.E.2d 809, 810 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
85 Id.  Under the Georgia anti-SLAPP statute, any party bringing a claim based on 
another party’s acts in furtherance of free speech or right to petition the government must 
also file a written verification asserting that the party or attorney has read the claim, that to 
the best of his or her knowledge, information and belief, the claim is well-grounded in fact 
and warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument to change existing law.  GA. CODE 
ANN. § 9-11-11.1(b).  If the party fails to file such verification with the complaint, the party 
has ten days in which to file an amended complaint that includes the verification.  Id. 
86 Davis, 536 S.E.2d at 810. 
87 Id. at 812.  The trial court opinion in this case has not been published, but the appellate 
opinion indicates the trial court’s decision that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law protected the 
magazine’s act of publishing the article.  Id. at 810. 
88 Id. at 812; see also Airtran Airlines, Inc. v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 
1369-70 (N.D. Ga. 1999), summary judgment den’d, 314 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (N.D. Ga. 2002) 
(declining to rule on the applicability of Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law to media defendants but 
stating that even if the anti-SLAPP law did apply, the defendants’ attempted use of the 
anti-SLAPP statute would still fail for failure to prove that the communication was made in 
good faith). 
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Judge Frank M. Eldridge expressly stated that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law 
had no application whatsoever to Atlanta Magazine’s claims because the 
magazine had published an article for profit about a local murder that in 
no way dealt with a petition in the public interest before a government 
body.89  Judge Eldridge’s concurrence fell squarely on the mark, as the 
Georgia Supreme Court later demonstrated in Berryhill v. Georgia 
Community Support and Solutions by holding that Georgia’s anti-SLAPP 
statute applies only to speech made in the course of or leading to an 
official proceeding.90   
b. Massachusetts 
Massachusetts has tackled the issue of media use of anti-SLAPP law 
in several lower court decisions.91  The most recent decision involving 
anti-SLAPP law and a media defendant is Islamic Society of Boston v. 
Boston Herald, Inc.92  In Islamic Society, the court focused on the meaning 
of petitioning activity and found that an organized media campaign to 
discourage the construction of a mosque did not fall within the definition 
of petitioning activity set forth in Massachusetts’s statute.93  The court 
                                                 
89 Davis, 536 S.E.2d at 813 (Eldridge, J., concurring).  Judge Eldridge argued that a statute 
in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed.  Id.; see also Steven H. Pollak, 
Anti-SLAPP Defense Nixed in Redding Biography Dispute, ENT. L. & FIN., July 2005, at 3 
(commenting on Eldridge’s opinion and Georgia’s anti-SLAPP).  Pollak’s article also 
describes a more recent unpublished Georgia state court opinion in which a biographer’s 
anti-SLAPP defense failed on procedural grounds similar to those in Davis v. Emmis 
Publishing Corp.  Pollak, supra, at 3.  The unpublished case discussed is Walden v. Freeman, 
Docket No. 04VS064224, heard in Georgia’s Fulton County Court.  Id. 
90 Berryhill v. Ga. Cmty. Support and Solutions, No. S06G0038, 2006 Ga. LEXIS 988 (Ga. 
Nov. 28, 2006). 
91 Islamic Soc’y of Boston v. Boston Herald, Inc., No. 05-4637, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
391 (Super. Ct. July 20, 2006); O’Neil v. Gilvey, No. 95-06626-E, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
578 (Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1998); Salvo v. Ottoway Newspapers, Inc., No. 97-2123-C, 1998 
Mass. Super. LEXIS 724 (Super. Ct. May 13, 1998), rev’d sub. Nom; Salvo v. Ottaway 
Newspapers, Inc., 782 N.E.2d 535 (Mass. Ct. App. 2003).  Massachusetts has a fourth case in 
which the court addresses the state’s anti-SLAPP law in a context involving a media 
defendant, Sarkis v. Grey2K, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 301 (Super. Ct. June 30, 2006).  In 
Sarkis, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for television commercials advocating the 
termination of greyhound racing.  Id.  The case was dismissed pursuant to Massachusetts 
anti-SLAPP law and the plaintiffs appealed.  Id.  The court’s published opinion does not 
examine the application of Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law to the media, but rather, focuses 
on the plaintiffs failure to pursue the appeal. 
92 No. 05-4637, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 391 (Super. Ct. July 20, 2006). 
93 Id. at **27-28.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 2000), which defines 
protected activity as: 
any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any 
written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 
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stressed that to be protected by Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP law, 
conduct must be part of a government proceeding, intended to influence 
a government proceeding, or be geared toward obtaining government 
review of an issue.94  Although the opinion focuses on the conduct of the 
non-media defendants, the court ultimately found that none of the 
defendants could claim the protections of the anti-SLAPP law.95  The 
court explained that the right to petition the government did not grant a 
person immunity from the tort of libel and that the defendants’ conduct 
appeared to have been motivated partially by religious intolerance.96  
The court mentioned the balance between the petitioning rights of both 
parties and held that to deny the Islamic Society the opportunity to 
pursue relief in this particular situation would likely be an 
unconstitutional application of Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law.97 
In Salvo v. Ottoway Newspapers, Inc., Salvo sued the publisher of the 
Salem Evening News for an article that suggested he had traded political 
favors in order to obtain permission for land development from the 
city.98  The publisher raised Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP statute as a 
defense, stating that Salvo’s lawsuit had been based on the publisher’s 
right to petition.99  The trial court agreed that the anti-SLAPP statute 
applied and held that Salvo had met his burden of demonstrating (1) that 
                                                                                                             
any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely 
to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any 
statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to 
effect such consideration; or any other statement falling within 
constitutional protection of the right to petition government. 
94 Islamic Soc’y, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 391, at **25-27.  The court criticized the 
defendants for invoking Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law because the challenged conduct 
occurred during a time when no governmental proceeding was underway.  Id. at *28.  
Moreover, the court found that the defendants’ public complaints, based in cultural and 
religious hostility, were not the kind of complaint a government entity could redress.  Id. at 
**30-31.  The court distinguished the defendants’ claims from the facts of Wynn v. Creigle, 
825 N.E. 2d 559 (Mass Ct. App. 2005), in which a firefighter’s widow spoke to the media 
about an ongoing government proceeding.  Islamic Soc’y, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 391, at 
*33.  The court explained that the fact that a statement concerns a topic that has attracted 
government attention does not mean that the statement is automatically protected under 
the anti-SLAPP statute.  Id. at *28.  The court further explained that to do so would bring 
any activity relating to an issue of public concern into the definition of protected petitioning 
activity (emphasis added).  Id. at **28-29. 
95 Islamic Soc’y, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 391, at **27-28. 
96 Id. at *35.  The court stressed that in order to protect the petitioning activities of both 
parties, Massachusetts requires defendants to prove that the plaintiff’s complaint had been 
brought solely on the basis of the defendant’s petitioning activity.  Id. at *32. 
97 Id. at **35-36. 
98 No. 97-2123-C, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 724, at **3-4 (Super. Ct. May 13, 1998). 
99 Id. at **4-5. 
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the publisher’s petition was devoid of reasonable factual basis or 
arguable basis in law; and (2) that he had suffered actual injury as a 
result of the publisher’s petitioning.100  Because Salvo had met this 
burden of proof under protective measures of the anti-SLAPP statute, the 
publisher could not prevail on its special motion to dismiss.101   
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision 
without addressing the lower court’s ruling or discussing the 
applicability of the state’s anti-SLAPP statute to the case.102  Rather, the 
appellate court held that Salvo could not have prevailed on the 
particulars of any of his defamation claims because the statements the 
newspaper had printed were not false and remanded the case to the trial 
court with instructions to grant summary judgment in favor of the 
newspaper.103 
                                                 
100 Id. at **6-10.  The Massachusetts anti-SLAPP states that when a party brings a special 
motion to dismiss under the state anti-SLAPP statute, the responding party must prove: 
“(1) the moving party’s exercise of its right to petition was devoid of any reasonable factual 
support or any arguable basis in law and (2) the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to 
the responding party.”  MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 2000).  Under Duracraft Corp. 
v. Holmes Products Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 942-43 (Mass. 1998), the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court structured the burden of proof such that a party bringing a special motion to 
dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute must first demonstrate that the claims against it are 
based solely on its petitioning activity and have no substantial basis outside such activity 
before the burden shifts to the responding party.  Id.  The Salvo court’s analysis did not 
focus on the media as a defendant, but rather, followed the Duracraft burden of proof 
without examining the identity or nature of the parties involved.  1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 
724, at **6-11. 
101 Salvo, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 724, at *11. 
102 Salvo v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 782 N.E.2d 535 (Mass. Ct. App. 2003).  The name 
of the newspaper is spelled differently in the Superior Court and Appeals Court decisions.  
Due to the alternate spellings, the two cases may not reference each other in electronic 
media.  The facts of the case indicate that the case is the same controversy. 
103 Id. at 540-42.  Although the court did not address the anti-SLAPP statute at all, 
because a plaintiff responding to a special motion to dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute 
must prove that the moving party’s petitioning activity was “devoid of any reasonable 
factual support or any arguable basis in law,” the substantial accuracy of the newspaper’s 
reporting would likely reverse the trial court’s grant of Salvo’s special motion to dismiss 
under the state anti-SLAPP law.  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H.  Several months after 
the Massachusetts Superior Court decided Salvo, it addressed the issue of anti-SLAPP 
applicability to a media defendant again in O’Neil v. Gilvey, 9 Mass. L. Rep. 237 (Super. Ct. 
1998), available at No. 95-06626-E, 1998 Mass. Super. LEXIS 578 (Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 1998).  In 
1991, Gilvey began working at Boston City Hall for the Boston Fair Housing Commission 
as a program specialist.  Id. at *2.  In 1991, the Boston Globe and Boston Herald published 
Gilvey’s allegations of sexual harassment against Boston City Counselor O’Neil.  Id. at *4.  
O’Neil then brought suit against Gilvey and the newspapers for the articles they had 
published about Gilvey’s allegations.  Id.  The newspapers raised the Massachusetts anti-
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Neither the Supreme Judicial Court, nor any Massachusetts appellate 
court, has directly stated that Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP law is 
available to media defendants.  However, the Massachusetts courts have 
expressed a willingness to apply the state anti-SLAPP statute in a wide 
range of situations, consistent with the legislative intent to enact broad 
anti-SLAPP protections.104   
c. Minnesota 
Somewhat like Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP law, Minnesota’s law 
focuses on the actual legality of the challenged conduct.105  A Minnesota 
appellate court ruled that the illegal nature of a media defendant’s 
conduct defeated its attempt to dismiss under the state anti-SLAPP law 
in Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television.106  Special Force Ministries 
operated various care facilities for mentally challenged adults.107  A 
reporter from WCCO lied to Special Force in order to obtain 
employment at one of its facilities.108  The reporter then secretly 
videotaped the facility and its employees while she worked there.109  
WCCO broadcast the tapes as an exposé on the facility.110  When Special 
Force Ministries sued WCCO, the station raised the Minnesota anti-
SLAPP statute as a defense.111  The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that 
                                                                                                             
SLAPP statute as a defense and the court granted their special motion to dismiss because 
O’Neil failed to provide opposition.  Id. at *15. 
104 McLarnon v. Jokisch, 727 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Mass. 2000) (noting that the legislature 
purposefully struck down any requirement that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP statute 
apply only in cases involving matters of public concern); Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. 
Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998) (describing the legislature’s intent to enact a broad 
statute). 
105 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 2000) (requiring a party moving to 
dismiss under the statute to prove that the challenged lawsuit is based solely on its 
petitioning activity), with MINN. STAT. § 554.03 (West 2000) (explaining that “conduct . . . 
aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action is immune from 
liability, unless that conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a violation of a person’s constitutional 
rights”) (emphasis added). 
106 584 N.W.2d 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998). 
107 Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television, 584 N.W.2d 789, 791 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1998). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 792; see MINN. STAT. § 554.01 (West 2000) (defining “public participation” as 
“speech or lawful conduct that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring 
favorable government action”).  Special Force Ministries brought complaints of trespass, 
defamation, and fraud, stating that the harm to their reputation had been so great that they 
had been forced to relocate to Missouri and that the residents with whom the reporter had 
had contact were emotionally harmed by her betrayal.  Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d 
at 791. 
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under the statute, Special Force Ministries had to prove by clear and 
convincing evidence that WCCO’s conduct was not immune from 
liability under the anti-SLAPP statute because the conduct constituted a 
tort.112  Specifically, the court reasoned that holding the media 
accountable for torts of trespass and fraud did not create tension with 
any First Amendment rights.113  The court subsequently affirmed the 
trial court’s decision that Special Force Ministries had met its burden of 
proving that WCCO’s conduct amounted to a tort, therefore rendering 
the conduct outside the protections of the anti-SLAPP statute.114  
Although WCCO’s broadcast was likely aimed at procuring favorable 
government action, it failed under the statutory requirement that 
protected conduct be lawful.115 
3. Broad Statutes 
The range of activity protected by anti-SLAPP statutes classified in 
the Broad Statute category is significantly more expansive than the 
activity protected in the Moderate Statute states.116  The states in this 
                                                 
112 Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d at 792; see also MINN. STAT. § 554.03 (explaining 
that “conduct aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government action is 
immune from liability, unless that conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a violation of a 
person’s constitutional rights”). 
113 Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d at 793 (“There is no inherent conflict or tension 
with the First Amendment in holding media representatives liable for the tort of fraud or 
trespass; neither the courts nor the legislature has given such representatives carte blanche 
to commit such torts in their pursuit of videotape.”).  Although the reporter argued that she 
had made no forcible or unlawful entry on to the Special Force Ministries facilities, the 
court held that the reporter was guilty of trespass because the tort of trespass in Minnesota 
included “any unlawful interference with one’s person, property, or rights.”  Id. at 792-93.  
The court did not specify exactly how the reporter’s conduct fit the Minnesota definition of 
trespass, but rather held merely that the definition of trespass was sufficiently broad to 
cover her conduct.  Id. at 793.  The court also held that the reporter had committed fraud by 
making affirmative misrepresentations to Special Force Ministries and by failing to disclose 
her true employment status when she had a duty to do so.  Id. at 793-94. 
114 Id. at 792-95 (discussing each alleged tort separately). 
115 Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d at 792-93; see MINN. STAT. § 554.01(6) (defining 
‘public participation’ as “[l]awful conduct or speech that is genuinely aimed in whole or in 
part at procuring favorable government action”); see also id. § 554.03 (“[C]onduct aimed in 
whole or in part at procuring favorable government action is immune from liability, unless 
that conduct or speech constitutes a tort or a violation of a person’s constitutional rights.”) 
(emphasis added).  The court appears to assume that WCCO’s conduct was otherwise 
protected and addresses only the legality of WCCO’s newsgathering conduct in its opinion.  
Special Force Ministries, 584 N.W.2d at 792-95. 
116 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 2000) (defining petitioning activity to 
include “any statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect 
such [government] consideration, or any other statement falling within constitutional 
protection of the right to petition government”), and MINN. STAT. § 554.01(C) (defining 
“public participation” as “[l]awful conduct or speech that is genuinely aimed in whole or in 
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category have broadened the protective reach of anti-SLAPP statutes 
beyond the Moderate Statute activities that encourage government 
review, either directly or through public participation, to include any 
conduct in furtherance of the constitutional right of petition or of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.117  
While intended to afford broad protection to citizens’ First Amendment 
rights, the anti-SLAPP statutes in this third category also can be the most 
problematic and open to uses outside the contemplation of citizen 
                                                                                                             
part at procuring favorable government action”), with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. 
§ 5-807 (LexisNexis Supp. 2006) (“A defendant in a SLAPP suit is not civilly liable for 
communicating with a federal, State, or local government body or the public at large, if the 
defendant, without constitutional malice, reports on, comments on, rules on, challenges, 
opposes, or in any other way exercises rights under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution . . . .”) (emphasis added), and IND. CODE § 34-7-7-2 (2006) (defining protected 
activity as any conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition 
or free speech). 
117 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-503(1) (2006) defines protected activity as: “An act in 
furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a redress of 
grievances.”  The statute continues the definition of petitioning activity similarly to the 
statutes in category two, but states that while the definition includes statements in 
connection with issues under consideration by government bodies and opinions regarding 
government bodies and officials, it is not limited to such statements.  Id.  CAL. CIV. PROC. 
CODE § 425.16(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) defines protected activity as: 
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative, 
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding 
authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in 
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding 
authorized by law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in 
a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an 
issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free 
speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. 
(emphasis added).  See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2006) and OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 30.142-30.146 (2006) for similar definitions of protected activity.  California has one other 
statute protecting communication to the government, CAL. CIV. CODE § 47 (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2006) (declaring privileged any publication or broadcast made in the proper 
discharge of an official duty during a government proceeding with certain exceptions, 
“communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also 
interested, or (2) by one who stands in such relation to the person interested as to afford a 
reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) 
who is requested by the person interested to give the information,” and “a fair and true 
report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) 
other public official proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, or (5) of a 
verified charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which 
complaint a warrant has been issued”).  See IND. CODE § 34-7-7-2 (defining protected 
activity as any conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition 
or free speech). 
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participation in government.118  Because of the expansive nature of their 
statutes, the statutes in the Broad Statute category are naturally more 
accessible to the media.119  Among the six states with anti-SLAPP laws 
classified as Broad Statutes, three states have addressed the applicability 
of anti-SLAPP law to media defendants.120   
a. California 
Of all of the anti-SLAPP statutes, California’s provides some of the 
broadest First Amendment protections.121  The media has invoked the 
protections of California’s anti-SLAPP law far too frequently for this 
Note to examine every case.122  Rather, this Note discusses two recent 
anti-SLAPP cases involving the media from the California Supreme 
Court and appellate courts that address issues that may raise the 
concerns of opponents of media protection under anti-SLAPP law.123 
When Steve Gates sued Discovery Communications over a true 
crime documentary concerning a murder that had occurred years ago, 
the California Supreme Court granted Discovery Communications’ 
motion to dismiss pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP law in Gates v. 
Discovery Communications, Inc. 124  Gates’s complaint alleged defamation 
                                                 
118 See generally Lauren McBrayer, The DirecTV Cases: Applying Anti-SLAPP Laws to 
Copyright Protection Cease-and-Desist Letters, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 603 (2005) (discussing 
DirectTV’s use of California’s anti-SLAPP statute to defend its actions in sending cease and 
desist letters to people who had purchased illegal cable pirating equipment).  Contra 
Hawks v. Hinely, 556 S.E.2d 54, 549 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).  When city officials sued citizens 
for the citizens’ formal applications to recall the officials from office, the court held that the 
anti-SLAPP clearly applied to the case given that the law was enacted to prevent abusive 
litigation against a person exercising the right to participate in government.  Id. 
119 See infra notes 124-74 and accompanying text. 
120 California, Louisiana, and Indiana have all addressed anti-SLAPP cases with media 
defendants.  See infra notes 124-74 and accompanying text. 
121 See Jerome I. Braun, Increasing SLAPP Protection: Unburdening the Right of Petition in 
California, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965 (1999); Kathryn W. Tate, California’s Anti-SLAPP 
Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 801 
(2000). 
122 A few other anti-SLAPP cases with media defendants from California include Ingels v. 
Westwood One Broadcasting Services., Inc., 28 Cal. Rptr. 3d 933, 941 (Ct. App. 2005), reh’g 
denied, No. S134735, 2005 Cal. LEXIS 9474 (Cal. Aug. 24, 2005), Rezec v. Sony Pictures 
Entertainment, Inc., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 333 (Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied, No. S124476, 2004 Cal. 
LEXIS 6647 (Cal. July 21, 2004), Colt v. Freedom Communications, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 245 (Ct. 
App. 2003), and Braun v. Chronicle Publishing Corp., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58 (Ct. App. 1997). 
123 See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text. 
124 101 P.3d 552, 553, 563 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 368 (2005).  The crime involved 
a car salesman murdered outside his home by professional killers.  Id. at 554.  An auto 
dealer had arranged the killing to prevent the car salesman from filing a class action suit 
against an auto dealership owned by the dealer’s parents.  Id.  At the time of the killing, 
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and invasion of privacy, claiming that until the broadcast of the 
documentary, he had lived a quiet and lawful life after having served his 
prison term and that the documentary falsely depicted him as a 
murderer, a crime for which he was never convicted.125  The trial court 
had held that the television station could not dismiss under the anti-
SLAPP statute because Gates had proven the likely success of his 
invasion of privacy claim.126  The California Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court’s decision and affirmed the decision of the appellate court, 
holding that the station could not be held liable for invasion of privacy 
for information it had gleaned from public records.127  Because Gates 
could not prove the probability of success of his invasion of privacy 
claim, the court granted the television station’s motion to dismiss 
pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.128   
In a less favorable decision for the press, the California Court of 
Appeals denied a television station’s motion to dismiss pursuant to 
California’s anti-SLAPP law in Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., where 
television reporters had posed as patients and recorded Lieberman, a 
                                                                                                             
Gates was working as an assistant manager for the dealer who was later convicted for the 
crime.  Id.  Gates had originally been charged as a co-conspirator, but the charges against 
Gates were later reduced.  Id. 
125 Id. at 554.  Gates had been convicted of a felony as accessory after the fact to a murder 
for hire in 1988.  Id.  In his complaint, Gates asserted that the television program falsely 
portrayed him as being involved in a conspiracy to murder and falsely suggested he had 
confessed to the murder.  Id.  The station broadcast the program nearly twelve years after 
the murder had occurred.  Id. 
126 Id. at 555; see CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006). 
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person 
in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the 
United States or California Constitution in connection with a public 
issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court 
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the 
plaintiff will prevail on the claim. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
127 Gates, 101 P.3d at 562.  The appellate court had based its reversal on Cox Broadcasting 
Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).  Gates, 101 P.3d at 554. 
128 Gates, 101 P.3d at 562-63 (holding that a media defendant cannot be civilly liable for 
publishing facts obtained through public records, even if such facts were not newsworthy).  
In deciding the case, the Gates court cited to multiple United States Supreme Court 
decisions addressing the issue, including Bartnincki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), which 
had held that unless a state demonstrated a need of the highest order, a state could not 
hold a newspaper liable for publishing truthful information that the paper had lawfully 
obtained, even if the party providing the newspaper with the information had obtained it 
unlawfully.  See Gates, 101 P.3d at 556-60; see also Fl. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Okla. 
Publ’g. Co. v. Dist. Ct., 430 U.S. 308 (1975); Cox, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (all holding that 
members of the press could not be held liable for publishing the name of a juvenile 
offender when the members had been lawfully present at the hearing in which the boy’s 
name had been revealed). 
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doctor, on a hidden camera when he dispensed medical advice.129  The 
reporters broadcast the footage they had surreptitiously obtained of 
Lieberman in a news segment on doctors that improperly prescribed 
controlled substances.130  Lieberman brought suit and the trial court 
denied the station’s anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss.131  The appellate 
court concluded that the station’s conduct, even if unlawful, occurred in 
furtherance of the right of free speech in connection with an issue of 
public concern and therefore fell under the definition of activity 
protected by California’s anti-SLAPP statute.132  However, the court also 
found that Lieberman had presented evidence sufficient for a prima facie 
case that the station had violated section 632 of the California Penal 
Code, which prohibits electronic eavesdropping.133  Accordingly, the 
                                                 
129 Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536, 539 (Ct. App. 2003).  
Lieberman sought damages pursuant to CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.2 (Deering 2005) for the 
violation of CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 (Deering 2006) as well as damages for lost income and 
emotional distress.  Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 539.  Section 632 of the California Penal 
Code prohibits electronic eavesdropping on private communications.  Section 637.2 is the 
statutory provision that sets forth damages for the provisions in the chapter including 
Section 632.  As a result of the broadcast, Lieberman had allegedly lost five hundred HMO 
patients, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, he could no longer testify as an expert 
at trials due to the taint on his reputation, his malpractice insurance provider refused to 
renew his policy, and the California Medical Board launched an investigation against him 
that included a police raid of his office.  Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 539.  Because of the 
emotional distress Lieberman experienced, he allowed his medical license to expire and 
ceased all practice of medicine.  Id. 
130 Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 539. 
131 Id. at 538.  The trial court determined that Lieberman had produced sufficient 
evidence to show a likelihood of prevailing on his claim that the station had violated CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 632 (West 2004).  Id.  See supra note 48 for a description of the burden of 
proof written into California’s anti-SLAPP statute. 
132 Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541-42.  Lieberman attempted to argue that because the 
station’s conduct was illegal, that it was unprotected by California’s anti-SLAPP law, but 
the court explained that the anti-SLAPP law protected conduct in furtherance of the right 
of free speech on a public issue and that although the station’s conduct may not have been 
lawful, it still fit the definition of protected activity provided by the anti-SLAPP statute.  Id. 
at 542.  The court also clarified the anti-SLAPP law’s burden of proof by stating that once 
the party claiming anti-SLAPP protection had proven that the suit in question had arisen 
from its acts in furtherance of free speech, the plaintiff then had to prove that the moving 
party’s acts were not protected by the First Amendment.  Id.  Citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); and Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 223 
Cal. Rptr. 58, 64 (Ct. App. 1986), the court acknowledged that news organizations are not 
privileged to commit crimes while gathering news.  Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 542.  
However, the court qualified the acknowledgment by explaining that no authority 
addresses the case of whether illegal activity is or is not in furtherance of First Amendment 
rights and that the language of California’s anti-SLAPP statute specifically required that its 
provisions be construed broadly.  Id. (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 2004 & 
Supp. 2006)). 
133 Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 543-46; see supra note 48 (detailing the protective burden 
of proof of California’s anti-SLAPP law).  Although the station urged the court to permit 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/9
2007] Anti-Slapp Law 1265 
court affirmed the trial court’s decision to deny the station’s motion to 
dismiss under the anti-SLAPP statute.134 
b. Indiana 
Indiana has only two published opinions regarding media 
defendants and its anti-SLAPP statute, the most recent of which affirmed 
that the protections of Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law extend to media 
defendants.135  In Shepard v. Schurz Communications, Inc., an attorney sued 
a local newspaper and a public official for publishing statements about 
him that were allegedly false.136  The court found that the newspaper had 
merely reported statements of “rhetorical hyperbole” made against 
Shepard by Litz, an opposing attorney, without adopting or endorsing 
the statements as the newspaper’s own opinion.137  The Indiana Court of 
Appeals held that, at least as far as the newspaper was concerned, the 
published statements undoubtedly implicated issues of public concern 
and were “lawful” according to established elements of defamation law 
in  Indiana.138   
                                                                                                             
the press an affirmative defense to CAL. PENAL CODE § 632 on the basis of the First 
Amendment, the court declined to address the issue.  Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 545. 
134 Lieberman, 1 Cal Rptr. 3d at 546. 
135 Shepard v. Shurz Commc’n, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 219, 226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
136 Shepard requested documentation of a delinquent sewer bill for a client and received 
a list of delinquencies from Monrovia town attorney Steven Litz that contained the contact 
information for fifty-one other Monrovia sewer customers.  Id. at 221-22.  Shepard sent a 
letter to each of the town’s customers informing them of the invasion of their privacy.  Id. at 
222.  A local newspaper published a story about the incident and included comments from 
Litz stating that Shepard was a liar.  Id.  Shepard sued Litz and the newspaper for 
defamation.  Id. 
137 Id. at 225-26.  To prevail under Indiana’s anti-SLAPP statute, the party asserting the 
protection of the statute must state specifically the issue of public concern that prompted its 
actions of petition or free speech and prove “by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
act upon which the claim is based is a lawful act in furtherance of the person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the 
State of Indiana.”  IND. CODE § 34-7-7-9 (3)(b), (3)(d) (2006) (defining protected activity as 
any conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or free 
speech).  If the court finds that a party’s attempt to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute was 
frivolous or intended only to delay the proceedings, the plaintiff can recover all attorney’s 
fees and costs in answering the anti-SLAPP motion.  Id. § 34-7-7-8. 
138 Shepherd, 847 N.E.2d at 224, 226.  The court explained that Indiana defamation law 
required an actual malice standard in regard to both public and private plaintiffs when the 
speech involved an issue of public concern.  Id.  In contrast to Shepard, the Indiana appellate 
court decided the only other Indiana case involving a media defendant on procedural, 
rather than substantive, grounds.  Poulard v. Lauth, 793 N.E.2d 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).  
Poulard appeared pro se, claiming damages for slander, libel, and defamation against the 
Michigan City News-Dispatch and several other defendants in response to an article the 
newspaper had printed about the Shores Town Council, of which Poulard was president.  
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c. Louisiana 
The most recent published Louisiana case examining the protections 
of its anti-SLAPP statute as they apply to a media defendant is Thompson 
v. Emmis Television Broadcasting.139  Reverend Thompson sued television 
station WVUE for defamation and for disclosing information contained 
in a sealed court record from a prior suit the Reverend had filed against 
the church where he was a pastor and certain members of the 
congregation.140  WVUE’s broadcast included statements from people on 
both sides of the controversy as well as statements from Thompson 
himself and his attorneys.141  WVUE eventually filed a motion to strike 
Thompson’s complaint pursuant to Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute.142  
When both parties appealed, the court noted that WVUE had not made 
any defamatory comments about the Reverend, but rather, merely 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 1122.  The newspaper raised Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law as its defense and the trial 
court ruled that the law applied and that Poulard’s claims should be dismissed pursuant to 
the statute.  Id.  On appeal, Poulard, now represented by counsel, argued that he should not 
have to pay the defendants’ attorney’s fees.  Poulard, 793 N.E.2d at 1123; see IND. CODE § 34-
7-7-7 (allowing a defendant who prevails on an anti-SLAPP motion to recover reasonable 
attorney’s fees).  Although Poulard’s appeal was based merely on attorney’s fees, the 
appellate court notes that the trial court’s decision to dismiss pursuant to Indiana’s anti-
SLAPP law was “imbued with newspaper defamation law.”  Poulard, 793 N.E.2d at 1123.  
As part of his argument, Poulard stated that the Indiana anti-SLAPP law did not apply to 
his situation as a citizen against the media and that if it did, it was unconstitutional.  Id.  
Because Poulard did not raise the applicability of the anti-SLAPP statute in the trial court, 
the appellate court did not rule on the applicability of the statute to a media defendant and 
awarded the defendants attorney’s fees pursuant to the statute.  Id. at 1123-25. 
139 894 So. 2d 480 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
140 Id. at 482.  The opinion does not give many details of Thompson’s prior suit, however 
the reader may infer that Thompson had originally sued his former church and 
congregation for defamation over allegations that he had embezzled money.  Id. at 484-86.  
His suit against the station appears to be based on the fact that they publicized the nature 
of the congregation’s original allegations against Thompson.  See id. (describing the 
contents of Thompson’s amended petition); id. at 486 (explaining that Thompson’s 
defamation suit against his former church and congregation was in response to allegations 
that he had embezzled church money).  The court record describing Thompson’s suit 
against the church was supposed to have been left under seal but had been mislabeled, 
thus the station’s reporter had full access to the record.  Id. at 482 n.2. 
141 Id. at 482. 
142 Id. at 483.  Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute provides, 
[a] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person 
in furtherance of the person’s right of . . . free speech under the United 
States or Louisiana Constitution in connection with a public issue shall 
be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that 
the plaintiff has established a probability of success on the claim. 
LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(A)(1) (2005).  Thompson did not show up to the hearing 
on the motion and the trial court dismissed his complaint with prejudice.  Thompson, 894 
So. 2d at 483. 
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reported the statements of those involved in the controversy.143  The 
court also pointed out that the Reverend had become a public figure 
through his political activism and the fact that he was suing his own 
church and congregation for defamation over allegations that he had 
embezzled funds was an issue of public interest.144  Because Thompson 
was a public figure, the court ruled that the Louisiana anti-SLAPP law 
applied to the media’s broadcast about the controversy.145  The appellate 
court agreed with the trial court that Thompson had not established a 
probability that his claims would succeed and struck down his 
complaint pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute.146  The court reasoned that 
Thompson had failed to prove that the station acted with malice or that 
the broadcast was false and awarded the station attorney’s fees pursuant 
to the provisions of the anti-SLAPP statute.147 
By the time the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
had ruled on the Thompson case, the Louisiana Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit had already permitted a media entity to use the state’s 
anti-SLAPP law to defend itself in court.148  In 2002, David and Ruby 
Johnson were murdered and their deranged son was the alleged killer.149  
Different members of the press spoke with law enforcement officers 
about the crime, and a local sheriff and deputy both told reporters that 
the deceased husband and wife were also brother and sister.150  As a 
result, several broadcasts by different stations identified David and Ruby 
Johnson as twin brother and sister who had later married and had 
children.151  In each instance, members of the Johnson family contacted 
the stations to inform them that David and Ruby Johnson were not 
brother and sister and the stations ceased to reference the couple as 
related.152  The family then filed a complaint for defamation against the 
                                                 
143 Id. at 486. 
144 Id. at 485.  In discussing the defamation claim, the court mentioned that for a public 
figure to prevail on such a claim, the party must prove that the statements were made with 
actual malice.  Id. at 486. 
145 Id. at 485. 
146 Id. at 486-87. 
147 Id. at 486-88.  The court held that because truth is a defense to a defamation claim, 
Thompson had no probability of success with his claims against the station.  Id. at 486. 
148 Johnson v. KTBS, Inc., 889 So. 2d 329 (La. Ct. App. 2004). 
149 Id. at 331. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  The opinion makes no mention of any retractions or corrections made by any of 
the television stations involved.  Id.  The plaintiffs’ complaint states a different story and 
alleges that the stations continued to broadcast the statement that the decedents were 
brother and sister, even after the stations had been informed otherwise by family members.  
Id. at 333. 
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television stations, and the stations responded with a motion to strike 
pursuant to Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP law.153  The trial court granted the 
motion stating that the stations had exercised their right of free speech in 
connection with a public issue and had broadcast their story in good 
faith, reasonably believing that their information had come from reliable 
sources.154  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the 
Johnsons did not have a likelihood of prevailing on their defamation 
claim because they would not be able to prove all of the elements 
required to succeed on the claim.155   
Two years before the Johnson case, Louisiana had affirmed the 
constitutionality of its anti-SLAPP law in another case involving the 
media, Lee v. Pennington.156  When George Lee III sued a newspaper and 
four New Orleans television stations for broadcasting a story about his 
arrest for three counts of rape, the media moved to strike Lee’s complaint 
pursuant to Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP law and Lee responded by 
challenging the constitutionality of the law.157  The court held that the 
                                                 
153 Id. at 331. 
154 Id.  Once the stations had shown that the Johnsons’ suit was based on their exercise of 
free speech regarding a public issue, the Johnsons needed to prove a likelihood of 
prevailing on their claim.  Id. at 332.  See supra note 48 for a description of the protective 
burden of proof in Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute. 
155 Johnson, 889 So. 2d at 333.  In Louisiana, to succeed on a defamation claim, a plaintiff 
must prove: (1) defamatory words, (2) unprivileged publication, (3) falsity, (4) malice 
(actual or implied), and (5) injury.  Id. at 332.  The court pointed out that none of the 
allegedly defamatory statements had been made about any of the plaintiffs, but instead 
were about the decedents, and that the plaintiffs had also failed to prove any actual 
damage to their reputations from the broadcasts.  Id.  The court also noted that because the 
statements were made in regard to a matter of public concern, the plaintiffs would need to 
prove that the statements had been made with actual malice.  Id. at 333.  The court implied 
that for a statement to be made with malice, it must be made with “knowledge that the 
information was false or with reckless disregard for the truth.”  Id. at 334.  Because the 
stations had relied on their sources in good faith, the plaintiffs had no probability of 
proving that the stations had not made the statements about the Johnsons with malice and 
thus, no probability of success on their defamation claim.  Id. 
156 830 So. 2d 1037, 1043 (La. Ct. App. 2002). 
157 Id. at 1040.  The news of Lee’s arrest was broadcast in 1999.  Id.  In 2001, Lee was 
found guilty of three counts of second degree kidnapping and five counts of forcible rape.  
Id. at 1040 n.1.  In his suit against the media, Lee claimed defamation, invasion of privacy, 
and malicious prosecution.  Id. at 1040.  In Lee’s complaint, the only portions of the 
broadcasts that Lee objected to were those that characterized him as a serial rapist.  Id. at 
1040 n.2.  In his constitutional challenge, Lee stated that the statute violated the principles 
of statutory construction, equal protection, and due process.  Id. at 1040.  Lee emphasized 
in his complaint that the anti-SLAPP law could not be used to defeat an enforcement suit 
brought by a state entity.  Id.; see LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(E) (2005) (“This Article 
shall not apply to any enforcement action brought on behalf of the state of Louisiana by the 
attorney general, district attorney, or city attorney acting as a public prosecutor.”).  Lee also 
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Louisiana anti-SLAPP law was constitutional because a plaintiff could 
proceed with his or her suit, even if it was based on the opposing party’s 
right to petition or exercise of free speech, if the plaintiff could prove a 
probability of success on his or her claim.158  The court also held that the 
statute did not violate equal protection because the statute does not 
classify individuals by race, religion, nationality, age, sex, physical 
condition, or political ideas.159  Moreover, the court found that the statute 
did not violate due process because the purpose of the statute is to 
dismiss frivolous suits, and would not prevent plaintiffs with valid 
claims from pursuing a case.160  The court held that the defendant 
stations had published the news about Lee in good faith as a matter of 
public concern and awarded the defendants attorney’s fees pursuant to 
the statute.161 
In a fourth case involving a media defendant, Louisiana’s anti-
SLAPP suit again shielded the media from liability for broadcasting a 
story on school truancy that included embarrassing footage of the 
plaintiff Stern.162  Television station WGNO had decided to run a news 
report on truancy in the local schools.163  Stern was stopped by a truancy 
officer, asked for identification and being unable to produce any, was 
taken to the truancy enforcement center.164  The station was at the 
enforcement center filming the activities and filmed Stern emptying his 
pockets, the contents including cash, a stick of gum, and a condom.165  
The station broadcast the story that evening including a voiceover quip 
about how Stern was “prepared, just not for school.”166  The report also 
included a statement that Stern’s mother had said Stern was not in class 
due to a paperwork problem and would be back in school the next 
day.167  Stern alleged that his sister also called the station prior to the 
broadcast to inform them that he had been sent home from school due to 
                                                                                                             
asserted that permitting a trial court to evaluate the probable success of a claim before the 
claim had been adjudicated on the merits violated due process.  Lee, 830 So. 2d at 1043. 
158 Lee, 830 So. 2d at 1041.  The court found that “the standard to be applied in 
determining the ‘probability of success’ [was] the . . . elements of the tort the plaintiff 
alleges the defendant committed, coupled with the legislative intent set forth when the 
statute was enacted.”  Id. 
159 Id. at 1042. 
160 Id. at 1043. 
161 Id. at 1044. 
162 Stern v. Doe, 806 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2001). 
163 Id. at 100. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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a paperwork problem.168  Stern sued the City of New Orleans and 
WGNO for false light invasion of privacy.169  WGNO raised Louisiana’s 
anti-SLAPP statute as a defense and the trial court struck Stern’s 
complaint pursuant to the statute.170   
On appeal, Stern argued that the trial court erred in determining (1) 
that he had no probability of success on his claim; and (2) in holding that 
the station’s footage of him was reasonably related to the public issue of 
truancy.171  The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that 
Stern had failed to prove a likelihood of success on his claim.172  The 
appellate court granted WGNO’s motion to strike, but declined to award 
the station attorney’s fees, stating that there was not sufficient evidence 
to indicate abuse of judicial process on Stern’s part.173  The decision 
suggests that while anti-SLAPP protection for media entities can be an 
effective way to prevent meritless suits that chill citizen participation in 
government, not all suits against media speech are an abuse of process 
per se merely because the plaintiff turned out to be incorrect. 
The following analysis compares the results in the state court cases 
that have examined anti-SLAPP protection for the media with the First 
Amendment protections extended to the news media under current 
Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
III.  ANALYSIS:  DOES ALLOWING THE MEDIA DEFENDANT ACCESS TO ANTI-
SLAPP LAW EXPAND ON EXISTING MEDIA PROTECTION? 
The courts of the eight different states that have addressed the 
applicability of anti-SLAPP protections to media defendants have, in 
                                                 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 100-01.  The court explained that false light invasion of privacy “arises from 
publicity which unreasonably places the plaintiff in a false light before the public.”  Id. at 
101.  In Louisiana, to prevail on a claim of false light invasion of privacy the plaintiff must 
prove a privacy interest, falsity, and unreasonable conduct.  Id. 
170 Stern, 806 So. 2d at 99. 
171 Id. at 100. 
172 Id. at 102.  The court found that Stern had no expectation of privacy on a public 
sidewalk and that the broadcast had not contained any false information.  Id.  The court 
also found that the station’s actions in having a reporter follow along with truancy officers 
to report on a matter of public concern was not unreasonable.  Id. at 102.  Quoting Roshto v. 
Hebert, 439 So. 2d 428, 430 (La. 1983), the court emphasized that more than insensitivity is 
required to impose damages on the media “when the publication is truthful, accurate and 
non-malicious.”  Id. at 101. 
173 Stern, 806 So. 2d at 102-03.  In choosing not to award attorney’s fees to the defendants, 
the court noted that Stern had plead in forma pauperis.  Id.  In forma pauperis is defined as 
pleading “in the manner of an indigent who is permitted to disregard filing fees and court 
costs.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1164 (8th ed. 2004). 
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most instances, decided the issue in a manner that reflects the existing 
First Amendment protections extended to the media as evidenced in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.174  This trend could be reassuring for 
states contemplating a moderate or broad anti-SLAPP law.  If the only 
increase in protection that anti-SLAPP law extends to the media is a 
speedier and more efficient process in defending itself against meritless 
suits, then everyone stands to benefit through the efficiency of 
unclogging court dockets and the economy of lowering the costs of 
litigation.175  The aspects of each law that contribute the most to defining 
the actual boundaries of anti-SLAPP laws are both the definition of 
protected activity under each statute and the statutory burden of proof 
protecting the petitioning rights of each party.176  Part III demonstrates 
that a moderate definition of protected activity, together with a 
“likelihood of success on the merits” burden of proof, works best to 
protect the media speech of greatest First Amendment importance.  
Part III.A analyzes how the definition of protected activity in the 
Moderate and Broad statutes affects the way the media can use anti-
SLAPP protection and whether the cases in the Moderate and Broad 
statute states remain within or expand upon existing Supreme Court 
precedent.177  Part III.B examines the way in which the burdens of proof 
written into the Moderate and Broad anti-SLAPP statutes has affected 
the outcome of the cases with media defendants in those states.178    
A. The Right Fit:  Protected Activity Defined 
Throughout Part II, this Note illustrated the interaction between 
anti-SLAPP statutes and the high value the U.S. Constitution places on a 
free press and media speech involving public and political issues.179  In 
contrast to this Supreme Court precedent, the limited language of 
Narrow Statutes not only fails to protect media speech, but also indirect 
forms of citizen participation in government.180  Conversely, Broad 
                                                 
174 See infra Parts III.A-III.B. 
175 Supra note 41 (listing early review in the litigation process as a key component of an 
anti-SLAPP statute). 
176 See infra Parts III.A-III.B. 
177 See infra Part III.A.  This Note does not analyze the anti-SLAPP laws or case law of the 
states that have Narrow Statutes because so few addressed anti-SLAPP cases with media 
defendants.  New York’s known case stays within the limited scope of its statute, Utah’s 
single known decision is unpublished and Oklahoma’s anti-SLAPP law is outside the scope 
of this Note.  See supra notes 72, 75-77. 
178 See infra Part III.B. 
179 See supra Parts II.B-II.C. 
180 See supra Part II.C.1. 
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Statutes, like those in California and Louisiana, stretch media protection 
too far, covering speech with little or no relation to citizen participation 
in government and in one case, activities that the state has otherwise 
deemed illegal.181  Striking a middle ground between these two 
extremes, the Moderate Statutes’ slightly narrower anti-SLAPP language 
does not bar protections for media speech covering most topics of public 
interest.182  For example, the language of Massachusetts’s, and 
Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP laws, by limiting the activity protected to 
speech discussing the government or aimed at procuring government 
action, cover media speech of the kind most vigorously protected by the 
Supreme Court.183   
A combination of Minnesota’s and Massachusetts’s definitions of 
protected activity would protect the most important media speech while 
excluding less valuable speech such as tabloid reporting from anti-
SLAPP protection.184  Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law covers statements 
reasonably likely to encourage government consideration of an issue or 
to enlist public participation in an effort to affect government consideration 
of an issue.185  Minnesota’s law covers “speech or lawful conduct 
genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable government 
action.”186  In this manner, both definitions easily extend anti-SLAPP 
protection of media speech to any communications made directly to a 
government body or in connection with issues under review by 
government bodies, but each also offers a unique safety valve that covers 
speech directed at public participation when such speech is not 
specifically addressed to a government body or regarding an issue under 
review in a current proceeding.  Because of the way each is worded, both 
statutory definitions protect a broader spectrum of conduct aimed at 
procuring government action or stimulating public debate on current 
issues without extending anti-SLAPP protection to every act, no matter 
how questionable, that is connected to free speech. 
                                                 
181 See supra Part II.C.3. 
182 See supra Part II.C.2.  While the applicability of Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute to media 
defendants remains in some doubt, the concurring opinion from Judge Eldridge in Davis 
decrying anti-SLAPP protection for the media may have been motivated by the fact that, 
unlike the issues surrounding the home for the mentally challenged in Special Force 
Ministries or the cases involving public officials in Massachusetts, Davis did not involve an 
issue concerning government or aimed at procuring government action.  See also supra Part 
II.C.2.a and notes 88-90. 
183 See supra note 17; supra Parts II.C.2.b-II.C.3.b; see also supra Part II.C.2.a; supra notes 88-
90. 
184 See supra note 17; supra Parts II.C.2.b-II.C.3.b. 
185 Supra note 93. 
186 Supra note 111. 
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To be most effective, a definition of protected activity must also be 
accompanied by a statutory provision encouraging broad construction of 
the statute, but worded such that the statute encompasses only lawful 
activity and involves only issues of public concern.  For example, 
Massachusetts courts’ interpretation of the legislative intent to enact a 
broad statute has caused courts to apply the anti-SLAPP law to matters 
that are not of public concern—an interpretation that stretches the 
Massachusetts law further than that of nearly any other state.187  From 
the standpoint of protecting citizen participation in government, the fact 
that the law protects all petitioning activity regardless of public interest 
makes Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP law the purest in regards to citizen 
protections.  However, such an interpretation could also cover the most 
salacious tabloid reporting.188  If the Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP law 
had included a policy statement limiting protection to petitioning 
activity regarding matters of public concern, the risk of providing anti-
SLAPP protection to media acts that invade the privacy of others would 
be lower. 
A definition of protected activity that does not limit anti-SLAPP 
protection to matters of public concern becomes even more troubling 
when coupled with Massachusetts’s requirement that the non-moving 
party prove that the moving party’s petitioning activity was “devoid of 
any reasonable factual support or any arguable basis in law” and caused 
the non-moving party “actual injury”—a burden of proof which could be 
nearly insurmountable.189  While the Massachusetts cases involving 
issues that are not of public concern may be sympathetic, opening the 
door to anti-SLAPP protection for statements on purely private issues 
would also extend protection to the least valuable media speech.190  This 
                                                 
187 Supra note 104. 
188 But see Islamic Soc’y of Boston v. Boston Herald, Inc., No. 05-4637, 2006 Mass. Super. 
LEXIS 391 (Super. Ct. July 20, 2006) (discussed supra notes 91-97).  The court’s decision that 
communications to the media and the resulting media campaign arising from religious and 
social antagonism did not satisfy the definition of protected activity because the conduct 
did not concern a governmental proceeding and was not directed at procuring action from 
a government official or entity.  Id. at **27-31.  Such a decision indicates that the 
Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law permits a court to draw the line at disingenuous 
communications—even on matters of public concern. 
189 Supra notes 45, 48. 
190 See supra note 17 (describing the most valuable kind of speech); see also Dun & 
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (explaining that speech 
unrelated to matters of public concern is less protected under the First Amendment).  But 
see supra note 49 (describing the facts of Fabre v. Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780 (Mass. 2002)). 
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Note addresses the burden of proof concern in more detail under 
subpart B.191 
The Lieberman case from California is a second example of an anti-
SLAPP interpretation that sweeps too broadly.192  The result in Lieberman 
falls in line with the current requirement that the media follow generally 
applicable laws as set forth in Cohen v. Cowles Media, Pell v. Procunier, and 
Branzburg v. Hayes.193  However, the court’s reasoning in Lieberman 
contradicts the same three Supreme Court opinions and extends anti-
SLAPP protection to all newsgathering activity, even if illegal, as activity 
that “furthers the right of free speech” as defined in California’s anti-
SLAPP statute.194  The court’s broad construction of the anti-SLAPP 
statute in this case pushes the envelope past the Cohen, Pell, and 
Branzburg holdings requiring the media to adhere to generally applicable 
laws.195  Moreover, because the activity of the press is nearly always 
activity that furthers the right of free speech, such reasoning ultimately 
leads to the preferential treatment of the press, a result that falls outside 
current Supreme Court interpretations of the First Amendment.196   
States considering anti-SLAPP legislation broad enough to protect 
the press should view Lieberman as a cautionary tale.  If any conduct in 
furtherance of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition 
is protected under anti-SLAPP law regardless of its legality, then suits 
concerning the most egregious media intrusions would be dismissed 
without adequate review, depending on the burden of proof that a state 
chooses to adopt.197   
                                                 
191 See infra Part III.B. 
192 See supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. 
193 See supra note 53 (explaining how Cohen, Pell, and Branzburg hold that the media is not 
exempt from generally applicable laws). 
194 Supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
195 See supra note 53. 
196 Id.; see also Branzberg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (“[T]he Court has emphasized 
that ‘[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the application of 
general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others.’” 
(quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937))).  It should be noted that a 
state law or judicial decision is not necessarily unconstitutional because it falls outside the 
standards articulated by the Supreme Court.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346-
47 (1974).  Gertz permits states wide latitude in setting standards of liability for the press.  
Id. 
197 For example, in Lieberman v. KCOP Television, Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 536, 540 (Ct. App. 
2003), when analyzing the probable success of Lieberman’s case against the station, the 
court noted specifically that Lieberman based his case on the violation of the Penal Code as 
opposed to any generalized tort claim.  While the California appellate court found that 
Lieberman did provide sufficient evidence that the press had violated a California statute 
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A point to consider in comparing the sweeping protections of 
Massachusetts and California’s statutes is that the broad protections of 
Massachusetts’s statute originated not in the language of the law itself, 
but rather, through a generous judicial interpretation of legislative 
intent.198  Conversely, the Lieberman court’s holding that California’s anti-
SLAPP law protects illegal activity as long as the activity is in 
furtherance of the right of free speech or petition originated from a 
reading of the plain language of the statute, illustrating the danger of 
overly broad anti-SLAPP language.199 
The California Supreme Court case Gates illustrates another risk of a 
broad definition of activity protected by anti-SLAPP law.200  While the 
result in Gates comports with the Supreme Court’s holding in Cox 
Broadcasting Co. and Florida Star, the result also goes against the principal 
of many anti-SLAPP laws and even the language of California’s own 
statute, which is aimed at protecting speech and petitioning activity on 
matters of public concern.201  The questionable level of involvement of an 
otherwise unknown person in a crime solved more than twelve years 
ago likely falls outside matters defined as being “of public concern.”202  
Comparing the similar facts of Gates to the facts of Georgia case Davis, 
makes it easier to appreciate Judge Eldridge’s objection to anti-SLAPP 
protection for the media when the protection encompasses tabloid-style 
stories about old crimes in that such media stories do little to promote 
citizen participation in government, the main reason for the existence of 
anti-SLAPP laws in the first place.203  
Although the language of Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP law is as broad as 
California’s, the case law from Louisiana evinces a strong adherence to 
existing Supreme Court precedent, demonstrating that broad statutory 
language, while riskier in regard to media abuse, does not automatically 
                                                                                                             
prohibiting electronic eavesdropping, the outcome of the case might have been very 
different had Lieberman pleaded only in tort.  See id. 
198 See Duracraft v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 941 (Mass. 1998) (explaining 
that the Massachusetts legislature had struck the phrase “of public concern” from an earlier 
version of the anti-SLAPP bill and failed to reinsert the phrase). 
199 Lieberman, 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 541-42; see supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text. 
200 Gates v. Discovery Commc’n., Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004). 
201 See supra note 54 (explaining through the holdings of Cox Broadcasting Company and 
Florida Star that the Supreme Court has refused to impose civil liability on the press for 
publishing information gleaned from public records); see also McBrayer, supra note 27, at 
607 (regarding the purpose of anti-SLAPP law); supra note 133 (California’s definition of 
protected activity). 
202 See supra note 59 for the Supreme Court’s test for recognizing matters of public 
concern. 
203 Compare supra Part II.C.2.a, and notes 84-90, with Part II.C.3.a, and notes 124-28. 
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add up to new and different protection for the press.204  The decisions of 
Thompson and Lee keep anti-SLAPP law close to the standards articulated 
by the Supreme Court, reflecting the holdings of New York Times and 
Gertz. 205  Johnson and Stern also follow Gertz, enforcing a similar burden 
of proof for private figures involved in matters of public concern.206  
Although both California and Louisiana’s statutes contain anti-SLAPP 
protections that encompass far more than citizen participation in 
government, both states limit the stretch of those protections through the 
second critical feature determining the scope of an anti-SLAPP law—the 
burden of proof.207 
B. Procedural Safeguards:  Preserving Petitioning Rights for All 
While the Moderate Statutes’ definitions of protected activity are 
better focused on protecting citizen participation in government than the 
definitions in laws with broader language, the feature that makes a 
critical difference in the practical scope of anti-SLAPP protection is the 
procedural safeguard written into each statute.  In this respect, 
                                                 
204 See supra, Part II.C.3.c; supra notes 139-74.  While Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law features 
protective language similar to California’s and Louisiana’s, the two Indiana cases citing the 
statute do little to examine the actual breadth of the Indiana law.  The results in Poulard and 
in Shepard line up neatly with traditional press protections in regard to public officials set 
forth in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.  See supra notes 55-56, 138 and accompanying text.  
Poulard’s actions in suing a newspaper for statements it printed about him in his role as a 
public official are so typical of a SLAPP that had the court applied the Indiana anti-SLAPP 
statute to the case, it is difficult to imagine that the media would have lost.  See supra note 
33 and accompanying text.  Shepard, decided on the merits, cements the Indiana standard 
and refers to principals identical to those announced by the Supreme Court in Sullivan and 
Gertz.  See supra notes 55-58, 135-38 and accompanying text. 
205 In Thompson, the court’s holding that the Reverend Thompson, a public figure, needed 
to prove actual malice on the part of the newspaper as well as the falsity of the statements, 
lines up with the standard the Supreme Court set for public figures in Sullivan.  See supra 
notes 55-56, 139-48 and accompanying text.  Similarly, in Lee, the court followed the 
standards the United States Supreme Court set forth in Gertz for media reporting on a 
private party involved in a matter of public concern when the court affirmed the media’s 
motion to dismiss pursuant to the state anti-SLAPP statute.  See supra notes 57-59, 157-62 
and accompanying text. 
206 Both Johnson and Stern involved private figures involved in a matter of public concern 
and in both cases the media erroneously reported aspects of the private individuals’ 
involvement in the matters at issue.  See supra notes 149-56, 163-74 and accompanying text.  
True to Gertz, Louisiana analyzed the likelihood that the plaintiffs could prevail on their 
claims by its own state standard and found that Johnson and Doe both failed to prove the 
necessary elements of defamation as a matter of law.  See supra notes 53, 57-59, 156, 173 and 
accompanying text. 
207 See supra note 48 for the respective burdens of proof written into California and 
Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statutes. 
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California’s and Louisiana’s statutes offer the best procedural balance 
between the petitioning rights of each party.  
Compared to California and Louisiana, the burdens of proof written 
into the Moderate Statutes analyzed in this Part provide too much 
protection for a defendant invoking the anti-SLAPP shield.208  For 
example, the question of what was or was not a reasonable basis in fact 
under the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law formed a key portion of both 
the trial and appellate courts’ analysis of Salvo.209  The two opinions are a 
literal difference in judicial opinion as to what facts comprising the 
controversy are true or false.210  The burden on the non-moving party to 
prove that the moving party’s petitioning activity was “devoid of any 
reasonable factual basis or arguable basis in law” and caused the non-
moving party actual injury, as required by the Massachusetts anti-
SLAPP law, indicates that the appellate court’s decision would likely 
have been the same had it followed the language of the statute.211  
The Massachusetts standard as applied in Salvo does not fall far from 
the “actual malice” standard announced under the Supreme Court’s 
holdings in Sullivan and Gertz.212  However, not all defamation cases 
necessarily involve public officials or matters that qualify as being of 
public concern.213  The fact that the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law and 
its strict burden of proof applies evenly to all parties and all issues, 
regardless of whether the issue is of public concern, likely increases the 
protection of the press under the Massachusetts law beyond the bounds 
                                                 
208 See supra note 48 to compare different procedural safeguards for anti-SLAPP motions.  
In contrast to the other Moderate anti-SLAPP laws in Massachusetts or Minnesota whose 
burdens of proof sweep too broadly, Georgia’s anti-SLAPP law does not feature a burden 
of proof that materially changes the scope of the statute.  See supra note 48 for an 
explanation of Georgia’s procedural safeguards.  Because the burden of proof written into 
Georgia’s statute requires only a verification on the plaintiff’s part at the time of filing that 
the complaint has been made in good faith, the burden creates no significantly new 
protections in regard to media speech.  See supra note 85.  The verification method bears a 
striking similarity to the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
which requires attorneys to sign each pleading.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a).  Similar to Georgia’s 
verification requirement, Rule 11 states that by signing a pleading, the attorney is certifying 
that the pleading is reasonable under the circumstances and is not being maintained for 
any improper purpose.  FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a), (b)(1). 
209 See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text. 
210 See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text. 
211 See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text; see also Salvo v. Ottaway Newspapers, 
782 N.E.2d 535, 537 (2003) (describing Salvo as a former city councilor). 
213 See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
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articulated in Supreme Court precedent.214  In addition, a burden of 
proof that heavily favors a party invoking anti-SLAPP protection 
hammers punitive measures that are already addressed by the statute’s 
mandatory award of attorney’s fees to a party whose motion to dismiss 
is successful, while unfairly impinging on the petitioning rights of the 
nonmoving party.215 
Like Massachusetts, the language of Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP statute 
is moderate in scope, but the burden of proof, which requires the non-
moving party to prove through clear and convincing evidence that the 
moving party’s conduct was tortious, is problematic in regard to media 
defendants.216  This standard reflects the standard of proof for 
government officials in Sullivan and the Court’s holding in Cohen that the 
media is not exempt from generally applicable laws.217  However, while 
this burden of proof was probably intended–like the Massachusetts 
burden of proof—to discourage SLAPP suits, such a provision could also 
expand protection for the press, or any other defendant in the same 
position, by pushing the burden of proof beyond the preponderance of 
the evidence standard used for most torts.218  Consequently, Minnesota’s 
anti-SLAPP law creates a potential windfall of protection for a defendant 
like the media whose conduct would have some protection even under a 
Moderate anti-SLAPP statute.219  
                                                 
214 See supra notes 48, 94 (discussing the burden of proof under Massachusetts’ anti-
SLAPP law); see also supra notes 59-61 (addressing the possible limits on the media as 
established by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) and 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001)); supra note 216 (reminding the reader that state law 
or jurisprudence expanding protection for the press is not necessarily unconstitutional).  
This Note argues, rather, that anti-SLAPP laws that offer more protection for the  press 
than the standards articulated by the Supreme Court result in anti-SLAPP laws less focused 
on actual citizen participation in government and less likely to garner wide support in a 
legislature. 
215 See supra notes 44-45. 
216 See supra note 48 for the burden of proof under Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP law. 
217 See supra notes 53, 55 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra note 48. 
219 See supra note 48.  Minnesota’s burden of proof essentially requires that a plaintiff be 
able to prove that the media had acted tortiously by clear and convincing evidence in 
regard to nearly any media speech.  MINN. STAT. § 554.02(2)(3) (West 2000).  While the 
language of Minnesota’s anti-SLAPP burden of proof may be problematic, the Special Force 
Ministries decision appears to be based as much on policy as it is on law.  Supra note 120.  
The result in Special Force Ministries v. WCCO Television lines up with Supreme Court cases 
Branzberg, Pell, and Cohen and suggests that, at the least, Minnesota courts might refuse to 
extend SLAPP protections outside the traditional tort law limitations on the media, 
regardless of the language of the statute.  See supra note 53 (describing the Cohen, Branzberg, 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 41, No. 3 [2007], Art. 9
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol41/iss3/9
2007] Anti-Slapp Law 1279 
Louisiana and California may have obtained differing degrees of 
deference to other law under the similar provisions of their Broad anti-
SLAPP laws, but the burden of proof required in these statutes creates 
optimal flexibility in its application.  By permitting a party to defeat an 
anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss if the party can prove a likelihood of 
success on its claim, the burden of proof for maintaining the suit aligns 
with the substantive elements of the claim.220  For example, in a state 
following the Sullivan standard, a public figure bringing a defamation 
action against the media would need to produce clear and convincing 
evidence that a statement was false and made with actual malice to 
overcome an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the suit.221  By contrast, a 
private party seeking to prove trespass or intrusion might need only to 
produce a preponderance of the evidence in support of their claim to 
succeed against a similar anti-SLAPP motion.  Therefore, a “likelihood of 
success” standard similar to California’s and Louisiana’s permits the 
state legislature and judiciary to address different sorts of claims in the 
manner each finds best.222  Such a burden of proof is ideal in that it 
deters SLAPP suits while working seamlessly with other bodies of law as 
well as preserving the petitioning rights of both parties. 
By contrast, Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law warrants a cautionary note in 
regard to the safeguard of a procedural burden of proof.  Under 
Indiana’s anti-SLAPP law, an anti-SLAPP motion must be dismissed if 
the party moving to dismiss proves by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the act upon which the SLAPPer’s claim is based is a “lawful act in 
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech” under the 
United States Constitution.223  Indiana’s requirement that the party 
invoking anti-SLAPP protection bear the burden of proof that its actions 
were lawful defeats the purpose of an anti-SLAPP law because placing 
the burden of proof on the party invoking the law’s protection weighs on 
the party under attack instead of putting the pressure on a party filing 
such a suit to reconsider its actions.224  Rather, statutes such as 
                                                                                                             
and Pell decisions as indications that the media is not exempt from generally applicable 
laws). 
220 See, e.g., supra note 156. 
221 See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra note 156. 
223 Supra note 137. 
224 Supra note 41.  For information about the legislative purpose behind anti-SLAPP laws, 
see PRING & CANAN, supra note 15, at 3 (describing SLAPP suits as chilling “citizen 
participation, volunteerism, public service . . . [and a threat to] the functioning of 
government” and holding forth anti-SLAPP legislation as a potential solution).  See also 
McBrayer, supra note 27, at 607 (describing anti-SLAPP laws as “[d]eveloped to protect 
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California’s or Louisiana’s which require the plaintiff to demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on its claim to defeat a motion to dismiss pursuant 
to an anti-SLAPP law serves the purpose of discouraging meritless suits 
without creating an insurmountable barrier for parties with legitimate 
claims.  
Overall, the application of anti-SLAPP law to media defendants has 
served the purpose of citizen participation in government by protecting 
the media’s ability to inform the public.225  However, the broad 
provisions and varied judicial interpretations of some anti-SLAPP 
statutes could ultimately be detrimental to getting anti-SLAPP laws 
sufficient to protect the media passed in the twenty-six states that have 
yet to adopt anti-SLAPP legislation.226  Those who harbor concern over a 
powerful and intrusive media will not be supportive of anti-SLAPP 
measures so broad that they protect otherwise illegal conduct or make it 
disproportionately difficult to defeat a motion to dismiss under anti-
SLAPP law.227  By synthesizing the best aspects of different state anti-
SLAPP statutes, it is possible to draft a definition of protected activity 
and burden of proof that best serve the interests of true citizen 
participation in government without leaving the law open to abuse. 
IV.  FREE TO BE YOU AND ME:  PROTECTING BOTH THE PRESS AND THE 
INDIVIDUAL CITIZEN 
The demonstrated effectiveness of Moderate and Broad anti-SLAPP 
laws in protecting the role of the media according to existing Supreme 
Court standards indicates that anti-SLAPP laws with language broad 
enough to cover the activities of the press are both workable and 
desirable.228  As illustrated in Part III, either the definition of protected 
activity or the burden of proof written into an anti-SLAPP statute has the 
potential to make existing media protections either more efficient or 
open to abuse.229  Consequently, a model statute needs both aspects of 
the statute to work toward the acts of free speech and petitioning activity 
genuinely aimed at procuring government action or sparking debate on 
public issues. 
                                                                                                             
citizens from meritless lawsuits filed by large private interests with the intent to discourage 
the citizens’ exercise of their constitutional rights”). 
225 See supra Parts III.A-III.B; supra note 17. 
226 See supra Parts III.A-III.B; see also supra note 16. 
227 See supra note 16. 
228 See supra Parts II.C.2-II.C.3. 
229 See supra Parts III.A-III.B. 
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An anti-SLAPP definition of protected activity that protects citizen 
participation in government through both individual activity and the 
press would incorporate the best aspects of the language of Minnesota’s 
and Massachusetts’s laws while retaining a burden of proof similar to 
that of California’s and Louisiana’s statutes.  Thus, “protected activity” 
under a model statute would be defined as:  
any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a 
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 
governmental proceeding; any written or oral statement made 
in connection with an issue of public concern under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial 
body, or any other governmental proceeding; any statement 
reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of an 
issue of public concern by a legislative, executive, or judicial 
body or any other governmental proceeding; any statement 
reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to 
effect such consideration; or any other lawful conduct 
genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable 
government action in regard to an issue of public concern.230  
                                                 
230 The proposed definition of activity gleans the specific language addressing many 
situations from the Massachusetts law while retaining the requirement from the California 
and Louisiana statutes that protected activity involve issues of public concern for the catch-
all phrase “any other lawful conduct.”  See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231 § 59H (West 2000), 
which defines protected activity as: 
any written or oral statement made before or submitted to a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body, or any other governmental proceeding; any 
written or oral statement made in connection with an issue under 
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or 
any other governmental proceeding; any statement reasonably likely 
to encourage consideration or review of an issue by a legislative, 
executive, or judicial body or any other governmental proceeding; any 
statement reasonably likely to enlist public participation in an effort to effect 
such consideration; or any other statement falling within constitutional 
protection of the right to petition government. 
See also CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e) (West 2004 & Supp. 2006) (including “any other 
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public 
interest” in its definition of protected activity); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971(F)(1) 
(2005) (listing out the activities that constitute acts “in furtherance of a person’s right of 
petition or free speech under the United States or Louisiana Constitution in connection 
with a public issue”).  The proposed definition also includes language from the Minnesota 
law protecting activity directed at procuring government action in whole or in part to fully 
encompass any and all activity that could be characterized as citizen participation in 
government.  See MINN. STAT. § 554.02(2)(3) (West 2000), which defines protected activity 
as “[l]awful conduct or speech that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring 
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The proposed definition requires that any statement not made 
directly to a government body involve an issue of public concern in 
order to be protected under anti-SLAPP law and also covers any and all 
lawful conduct aimed in whole or in part at procuring favorable 
government action, including enlisting others to engage in such action.  
A definition like the one above covers nearly any political speech or 
speech addressing issues of public concern, from a citizen’s Web site 
about municipal issues to a t-shirt that says “Support Our Troops” to 
Oprah Winfrey’s talk show episode about mad cow disease.231 
One criticism of the above solution is that a statute that excludes 
certain matters from protection because they are not of public concern 
overlooks sympathetic cases of genuine petitioning in front of a 
government body such as the case of Fabre v. Walton.232  The proposed 
definition is unlikely to exclude such claims because the provisions 
regarding direct communication with the government do not require the 
communication to involve an issue of public concern.  Rather, the 
requirement that the activity involve issues of public concern in order to 
qualify for anti-SLAPP protection applies only when the activity is not 
addressed directly to the government. 
In addition, the model statute would contain a burden of proof 
stating that if a court finds the complained-of activity to be within the 
definition of activity protected under the anti-SLAPP law, that the court 
“shall dismiss the claim, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has 
established a probability of success on the claim.”233  The proposed 
procedural safeguard still places the pressure on the filer to justify a suit 
that could be characterized as a SLAPP, but does not create 
insurmountable odds for a party with a legitimate claim.234  This burden 
protects the media speech geared toward citizen participation in 
                                                                                                             
favorable government action is immune from liability, unless the conduct or speech 
constitutes a tort or a violation of a person’s constitutional rights.” 
231 Ironically, under the anti-SLAPP legislation proposed in this Note, Oprah Winfrey’s 
broadcast about mad cow disease would likely have fallen into the definition of protected 
activity proposed in this Note, while Tom Leykis’s radio broadcast would not.  See supra 
notes 1-8 and accompanying text. 
232 781 N.E.2d 780 (Mass. 2002).  See supra note 49 for a summary of Fabre’s facts. 
233 This proposed burden of proof draws directly from the procedural safeguards 
California’s and Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statutes.  See supra note 48. 
234 See supra note 41 (explaining the importance that the burden of proof to maintain the 
suit land on the SLAPP filer).  Cf. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000) (requiring a 
party responding to an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss to prove that the moving party’s 
exercise of its right of petition was devoid of any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law and that the moving party’s acts caused actual injury to the 
responding party). 
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government without extending anti-SLAPP protection beyond existing 
limits on the media. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
To truly protect citizen participation in government, the language of 
anti-SLAPP laws must also protect the media.  Existing case law that 
examines the protections of anti-SLAPP law to the media demonstrates 
that courts have generally declined to extend the media any more 
protections under anti-SLAPP law than the media already enjoys under 
current Supreme Court precedent.  Language limiting the application of 
anti-SLAPP law to statements and conduct genuinely directed at 
producing government action regarding issues of public concern focuses 
anti-SLAPP protection on the most legitimate forms of media speech. 
Likewise, a burden of proof that requires a SLAPP-ing party to prove a 
likelihood of success on his or her claim works in tandem with the 
established elements of the claim in question without providing 
increased substantive protection to a party invoking the anti-SLAPP law 
as a shield.  By incorporating these provisions into their anti-SLAPP 
laws, states seeking to enact anti-SLAPP legislation will strike the right 
balance of shielding the media reporting that promotes citizen 
participation in a democratic government without handing tabloid 
reporters a sword. 
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